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ABSTRACT
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) lie at the cutting edge of a tectonic transformation in global
business and international law embodying the sweeping changes in the global order. Illustrating
the new financial and legal paradigm, SWFs demonstrate the blurring of lines between public actor
states and private market actors. Ostensibly entrusted with the advancement of the public good of
their respective citizenry, SWFs traditionally invested their vast pools of capital in apolitical,
non-controversial, conservative government debt. Starting around 2006–2007, SWFs initiated an
aggressive campaign of diversification and commenced allocating their immense investment
capital into equity markets, real estate, energy projects, farming and private equity. This significant
change led to SWF investment becoming inextricably linked to strategic industries in recipient
nations. Simultaneously, apprehension developed in capital recipient nations with respect to
potential non-financial motivation of SWF investment and the interrelated national security
implications. In response, SWFs emphasized that they were not interested in exercising control
over companies or countries, voluntarily limited their stakes, and expressed intent to embrace a
passive shareholder approach. Since plowing into various investment markets, SWFs have
generally acted cautiously and refrained from activist conduct which substantially obviated
concerns over undue foreign control in host states. However, SWFs have recently undertaken a
more activist investment approach comparable to other large investors. While the SWF activism is
profits-centric, the behavioral shift reintroduces anxieties with respect to foreign government
influence over political decision-making in host nations as well as undue dominance over strategic
industry and infrastructure. Moreover, given their titanic financial strength, even profits based
investment raises concerns over SWF dominance and influence over financial markets, portfolio
companies and economic sectors.
In the United States, securities laws mandate disclosure and regulatory approval for certain
transactions. Such laws afford regulators an opportunity to review investment activity and provide
an alert to ascertain whether the investor is in compliance with rules and regulations. In light of
the budding activism, it is timely to examine whether securities laws need to be updated.
What are the ramifications of SWFs working with other SWFs with respect to acting in concert and
group action? Are SWF investors sufficiently different as to justify heightened regulation? This
article will examine current US regulatory policy, identify potential shortcomings in light of the
developing investment climate, and concludes with suggested reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
At the vanguard of the new global financial architecture where East, West, North and South
converge, and the borders between public and private actor blur, are state-owned financial
superstars known as sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).1 Ever controversial,2 SWFs are ostensibly
entrusted with the advancement of the public good of their respective citizenry.3 SWFs are not new
and have existed for decades.4 Historically, SWFs invested in apolitical, non-controversial,
conservative government debt.5 However, from approximately 2006-2007, SWFs began a concerted
effort at diversification, allocating their immense investment capital into equity markets, real estate,
energy projects, farming, and private equity.6 This paradigm shift led to SWF investment becoming
inextricably linked to strategic economic sectors in recipient nations.7 Simultaneously, concerns
arose with respect to possible non-financially motivated decisions and the implications to national
geo-political interests.8 In response, SWFs emphasized they were not interested in exercising
1The new international financial, legal and technological order has created an almost borderless world.
This participation of states directly in markets (production, ownership, finance and the like) is not
merely in the old and now fairly tame form of public, central planning-based, political regimes, or the
sort of ownership that traditionally constituted state enterprises, i.e., mercantilist/Marxist-Leninist
undertakings with a long and well understood history and purpose . . . The facilitating cause of this
change in approach is the creation of the very system that frees economic actors from the constraints
of territory and more closely binds public actors thereto.
Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned
Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10–11 (2010) (emphasis added).
A primary manifestation of this new global phenomenon are SWFs. See Joel Slawotsky, Corporate liability for violating
international law under The Alien Tort Statute: The corporation through the lens of globalization and privatization, 6 INT’L. REV.
OF LAW 1, 2 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/irl.2013.6 (“The blurring of distinctions between public and private actors is further
exemplified by the emergence of sovereign wealth funds.”).
2SWFs raise important questions regarding ethics, politics, the potential for non-financially motivated investment and
a state’s “enforcement” of international law. See Larry Catá Backer, The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund: Between
Private and Public, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1275 (2009) (“[Norway’s SWF] conflates state action in private form and the
more advanced elements of economic social responsibility.”). SWFs also raise issues with respect to corporate
governance of portfolio companies. Yaron Nili, The Corporate Governance of Sovereign Wealth Funds, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Aug. 7, 2014, 9:07 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/
08/07/the-corporate-governance-of-sovereign-wealth-funds/ (“[W]e should expect that, as SWFs continue to acquire
equity interest in certain nations (e.g. US), the issue of their engagement in corporate governance will continue to raise
questions). See also Patrick J. Keenan, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Social Arrears, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 432 (2009)
(noting a “host of questions” are raised by SWFs). Illustrating a controversial aspect of SWFs, Norway’s SWF decided
that its investment portfolio would not include cluster bomb manufacturers and nuclear weapons producers. As a result,
certain American companies were banned from the fund. Affected companies included iconic American businesses such
as General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Norway’s SWF also blacklisted Walmart based
upon child labor practices and anti-union activities. The United States Ambassador to Norway stated in response to the
divestment of Walmart, that “[a]n accusation of bad ethics is not an abstract thing. They’re alleging serious misconduct.
It is essentially a national judgment of the ethics of these companies.” See Mark Landler, Norway Keeps Nest Egg From
Some U.S. Companies, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/04/business/worldbusiness/04norway.
html?_r¼2&oref¼slogin&. Concerns also exist as to SWFs potential to exert nefarious influence.
3SWFs can, of course, be used for the enrichment of rogue leaders. Indicative of the potential of widespread
fraudulent abuse is the fact that “[s]tates [exist] whose citizens need development and humanitarian assistance even
while their leaders invest abroad via SWFs.” Keenan, supra note 2, at 439–40. This discrepancy “highlights the gulf
that often lies between those in power and citizens in poor states.” Id. at 440. For example, in Libya an astounding
sum of $200 billion was diverted from Libya by former leader Col. Kadafi into bank accounts, real estate, stock
investments and businesses abroad held in the name of the Libyan SWF and other national institutions. See Paul
Richter, As Libya Takes Stock, Moammar Kadafi’s Hidden Riches Astound, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, http://articles.
latimes.com/2011/oct/21/world/la-fg-kadafi-money-20111022 (“Moammar Kadafi secretly salted away more than $200
billion in bank accounts, real estate and corporate investments around the world before he was killed . . . .”).
4See Meg Lippincott, Depoliticizing Sovereign Wealth Funds Through International Arbitration, 13 CHI J. INT’L L. 649,
654 (2013) (“The first SWFs arose in the 1950s, when the Kuwait Investment Authority and the Kiribati Revenue
Equalisation Reserve Fund were established to invest surplus government funds.”).
5Ronald Gilson & Curtis Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to
the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2008) (“Until recently, these surpluses were conservatively invested,
heavily in U.S. treasury securities and other national government bonds.”).
6See Slawotsky, supra note 1, at 22 (“SWFs are increasingly acquiring ownership stakes in corporations all over the
globe. State actor SWFs are involved in: utilities, banking, brokerage, stock exchanges, warehouses, farming, and
infrastructure.”).
7Id.
8See Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going
Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2009) (“SWFs have existed for decades, but today they face heightened scrutiny due to
their recent rapid growth and a concomitant shift in their investment strategy from primarily conservative debt
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control over companies, voluntarily limited their stakes, and expressed intent to embrace a passive
shareholder approach.9 Since plowing into various investment markets, SWFs have indeed
generally acted cautiously and refrained from activist conduct, which substantially obviated
concerns over undue foreign control.10
However, SWFs have recently steered towards a more activist investment approach11 similar to other
major investors.12 This new activism – which includes partnering with other large investors – both
private and public – renews concerns with respect to foreign government influence over political
decision-making in host nations as well as undue dominance over strategic industry and infrastructure.13
Illustrating these anxieties over nefarious investment motivations, the United States has increasingly
become more active in scrutinizing business transactions either rejecting deals or insisting on post-deal
divestment.14 In the United States, the Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS) is an important
mechanism utilized to prevent undue foreign influence over key American industries.15 For example,
the United States aggressively assessed the national security implications of China’s Lenovo’s intent to
acquire the server business of IBM before ultimately approving the transaction.16
Footnote continued
instruments to higher risk/reward equity investments. This shift in strategy has stoked fears in the United States and
Europe that these funds-which find home primarily in the Middle East and Asia-will use their economic clout to
pursue political goals. This type of rhetoric has led some to call for increased regulation of SWFs.”).
9See, e.g., Heidi N. Moore, Wall Street Banks: Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Speak Up? WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2009,
5:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/01/08/wall-street-banks-will-sovereign-wealth-funds-speak-up/ (noting that
SWFs were passive).
10See Ashby Monk, Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate Trust Legitimacy and Governance, SOC. SCI.
RESEARCH NETWORK at 2 (Nov. 27, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼1134862 (“The Kuwait
Investment Authority stated their SWF have ‘been passive in all [its] investments [ . . . .] [It] has not played an active
role or been an activist with [any] of [its] shares.’”). See WHARTON LEADERSHIP CTR. & JOSEPH H. LAUDER INST. MGMT. INT’L
STUDIES, THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (2010), available at http://d1c25a6gwz7q5e.cloudfront.net/
papers/download/052810_Lauder_Sovereign_Wealth_Fund_report_2010.pdf (same).
11Richard Levick, Game-Changer: Qatar Plays Historic Role in Glencore’s Bid for Xstrata, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:23
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2012/09/12/game-changer-qatar-plays-historic-role-in-glencores-bid-
for-xstrata/ (describing Qatar’s involvement in the Glencore Xstrata merger as “a watershed moment when a SWF acts
like an activist shareholder . . . .”); See Nili, supra note 2 (“[W]e see more and more that some SWFs do exercise their
voting rights . . . ”).
12Large funds have become activist investors in the United States. See Randall Smith, Some Big Public Pension
Funds Are Behaving Like Activist Investors, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/28/some-big-public-pension-funds-
are-behaving-like-activist-investors/?_r¼0 November 28, 2013 (noting that large pension funds are becoming
increasingly active and that “several big United States public funds [] have played roles in shareholder uprisings in
recent years.”). Large fund activism has proponents. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013),
available at http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Gilson-Gordon.pdf (“The role for activist
shareholders is to potentiate institutional voice; specialists in monitoring combine through the capital markets with
specialists in low-cost diversification to provide a form of market-based stewardship.”).
13See Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Emerging Financial Superpowers: How U.S. Regulators Should
Respond, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1255 (2009) (“SWFs also have the potential to succeed at forms of activism in which
private activist investors have had only mixed results. Professor Fleischer notes the possibility that the US
Government’s decision to save Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the way that it did, diluting shareholder equity while
leaving debt holders relatively unscathed, might have been partially related to the fact that China was both
companies’ largest debt holder.”). See also Nili, supra note 2 (“[W]e see more and more that some SWFs do exercise
their voting rights. So, a move towards shareholder rights and influence may exacerbate national security concerns
in situations where SWFs have gained a significant equity stake in a corporation.”).
14See Anthony Lin, U.S. Court Throws Out Chinese CFIUS Challenge, AMERICAN LAWYER, Oct. 11, 2013, http://www.
americanlawyer.com/id¼1202623198261/U.S.-Court-Throws-Out-Chinese-CFIUS-Challenge?slreturn ¼ 20140319153553
(CFIUS rejection of a Chinese corporate transaction based upon security concerns and President Obama’s issuance of
an executive order blocking the transaction. Ralls filed suit, lost but obtained a reversal on appeal.) See also
Divestment Of Procon Investment In Lincoln Mining Required As A Result Of US Regulatory Review, LINCOLN MINING
CORP., June 18, 2013, http://www.lincolnmining.com/news/index.php?&content_id¼255 (CFIUS requirement that
Chinese investors divest their controlling interest investment in Lincoln).
15U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-on-Foreign-Investment-in-US.aspx. See also JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) (Mar. 6, 2014), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
16See Brian Wingfield & Edmond Lococo, A Lenovo Bid for IBM Unit Seen Sparking Security Review, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 22, 2014, 11:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-22/u-s-security-review-seen-should-lenovo-bid-
for-ibm-unit.html (“Growing Chinese investment in the U.S. has prompted national-security concerns. Proposed
transactions by Chinese companies accounted for about 20 percent of the 114 reviews by an inter-agency government
panel in 2012, supplanting the U.K. as the most-scrutinized nation.”). The deal was, in fact, approved. See Alex Barinka &
David McLaughlin, IBM Obtains U.S. Approval for Sale of Server Business to Lenovo, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2014, 5:37 PM),
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However, the current CFIUS regime was found to be problematic by the D.C. Court of Appeals in
Ralls v. Obama,17 thus furthering the importance of securities regulations given the potential of a
reduction in CFIUS’s power.18 While not designed to screen foreign investment as CFIUS is, securities
laws in the United States laws can serve as another crucial regulatory mechanism – a complement to
CFIUS – to detect improper foreign investment. CFIUS is admittedly limited, (and in light of the D.C.
Circuit ruling, may potentially become less powerful), and US securities laws can fill an important
function.19 Securities laws mandate disclosure and regulatory filings for certain transactions,
providing an alert to ascertain whether the investor is in compliance with rules and regulations.20
For example, pursuant to US securities law, each owner of a five percent stake in a company’s shares
must report the holding.21 If more than one investor owns more than a five percent share, the law
treats the individual holdings severally. Thus, multiple SWFs could potentially individually own less
than the five percent percentage trigger, and yet collectively own more than five percent percentage
of shares. Such a position would allow them to pressure management, or engage in other activist
behavior without filing the required disclosure statements.22
However, while severally-owned, under securities laws, if the several holders are acting “as a
group,” the investors are treated as members of the group and the law aggregates the several
holdings.23 Under what circumstances are investors considered a “group”? Pursuant to the Second
Circuit’s CSX Corporation v. Children’s Investment Fund Management ruling, there must be a tangible
agreement to form a group.24 Under CSX, “group action” exists when members “act as a . . . group
for the purpose of acquiring [or some other activity with respect to the] securities of an issuer.”25
In light of budding activism, it is timely to examine the issue of aggregating SWF holdings.26 What are
the ramifications of SWFs working with other SWFs or other large funds with respect to acting in concert
and group action? SWFs, being advised by large law firms, will likely avoid conduct that would directly
constitute group activity.27 Are SWF investors sufficiently different as to justify heightened regulation?28
After all, “[f]oreign government investors are different from other institutional investors (i.e., mutual,
Footnote continued
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-15/ibm-gets-u-s-approval-for-sale-of-server-business-to-lenovo.html
(“While CFIUS placed some conditions on the deal, they don’t significantly affect the business, and terms of the
transaction didn’t change as result, a person with knowledge of the matter said, without specifying the conditions. The
sale drew scrutiny because of disputes between China and the U.S., the world’s two largest economies, over
cyberintrusions. By completing the deal, IBM can jettison a less profitable business to focus on growing areas, such as
cloud computing and data analytics, while giving Lenovo a bigger piece of the global computing-hardware market.”).
17See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reversing the
district court decision and unanimously holding that President Obama’s order unwinding a Chinese-controlled
acquisition had deprived the buyer of a constitutionally protected property interest without due process).
18The possibility of an overhaul or at least a weakening of CFIUSs power to screen investors with nefarious
intentions is a reasonable possibility in light of the decision.
19See Executive Summary, U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
annual_reports/Executive%20Summary%202013.pdf (last visited May 21, 2014), at page 3 (“The United States has a limited
screening process for determining the potential national security threat from a specific foreign investment.”).
20See infra Section III.
21See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000).
22This is not to suggest that engaging in activist investing should be illegal for SWFs. However, due to the
exceptional nature of SWFs and the anxieties concerning foreign influence over American industry and national
security, this proposes lowering the reporting trigger for SWFs. Doing so would protect the rights of SWFs while
assuaging apprehension about SWF motivations.
23See Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 507–08 (2d Cir. 2007) (disclosure requirements mandating that
membership in a “group” wherein in the aggregate the “group” owns 5 percent of a publicly traded company’s
shares, “if two or more entities agree to act together for any of the listed purposes, a ‘group’ is ‘thereby’ formed.”).
24See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the district
court’s ruling that circumstantial evidence consisting of two investors’ multiple meetings established the formation of
a group).
25Id. at 284.
26See Nili, supra note 2, (“This partly explains why investor activism and corporate governance are still ripe and,
only very recently, an emerging trend within the SWF framework.”).
27SWFs are represented by large law firms such as White & Case (see Sovereign Wealth Funds, WHITE & CASE,
http://www.whitecase.com/sovereign/#.UqhQEfQW3CY (last visited Apr. 19, 2014); Jones Day (see Sovereign Investors,
JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/sovereigninvestors/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2014); and Skadden (see Mergers and
Acquisitions, SKADDEN, http://www.skadden.com/practices/mergers-and-acquisitions (last visited Apr. 19, 2014)).
28Scholars have also raised the possibility that restrictions against sovereign wealth fund investments in capital
recipient nations may violate investment treaties. See Locknie Hsu, SWFs, recent US legislative changes, and treaty
obligations sovereign wealth funds, recent US legislative changes, and treaty obligations, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 451,
451–77 (2009).
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pension, and hedge funds), because they are not only large, but also foreign and politically
connected.”29 The immense assets of SWFs provide these funds with astonishing firepower so that
ordinary rules of investing may be substantially less relevant and significantly immense leverage is
available vis-à-vis obtaining influence over companies and industries.
This article examines current US regulatory policy, identifies potential shortcomings in light of
the developing investment climate, and concludes by offering suggested reforms. The first section
describes SWFs and provides a factual background detailing their developing financial prowess.
It discusses how SWFs once relegated their capital to passive, low risk investments which raised
little or no apprehension regarding foreign influence over host nation economic or security
interests. However, with an ever-increasing active investment approach including buying equity
shares, real estate and energy assets, concerns have increased regarding potential non-financial
motivational investment. The section will also discuss various proposals aimed at balancing
concerns while at the same time encouraging SWF investment in host nations. The second section
details the phenomenon of activist investing both in general terms as well as SWF specific
activism. Activist investing, (once the province of “cowboy” investors,) has gone mainstream with
large “respectable” funds now engaging in this practice. SWFs, as a type of large fund, can be
expected to exercise a more activist investing style. The third section discusses several US
securities laws in the context of SWF investment. The fourth section discusses proposals to modify
the existing securities regulatory framework. While the securities laws were designed to prevent
unfair takeovers and informational advantage and were not intended to screen inappropriate
foreign ownership, the securities laws in particular can serve as an additional tool to address
anxieties. Given the colossal economic power of SWFs, the recommended amendments should
serve to detect and discourage improper conduct. The proposed updates offer the specter of
addressing legitimate concerns over SWF purchases of corporate stakes while simultaneously
encouraging the free movement of capital necessary for a prosperous economy.
I. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND NATIONAL INTEREST
CONCERNS IN RECIPIENT NATIONS OVER SWF INVESTMENT MOTIVATION
SWFs are large pools of capital owned by sovereigns.30 The source of capital is generally derived from
international trade, usually exports of energy products such as crude oil and natural gas or some other
product.31 The earnings are placed into SWFs where they are invested for various purposes.32 SWFs are
unique investors since they are considered part of governments or central banks.33 This section will
describe the exceptional qualities of SWFs, host nation anxieties regarding non-SWF impingement on
national interests, and attempts to bridge the gap between recipient nation apprehension with regard
to those domestic security concerns and the crucial need for foreign investment capital.
A. The unique nature of SWFs
A revolutionary transformation is changing the established global international law and economic
dynamic.34 SWFs are at the forefront of the new global international law and financial structure,
embodying the “visible manifestations of these tectonic changes in the organization of the global
order.”35 Indeed, “[t]he old understanding of international law as something created solely by and
for sovereigns is defunct.”36 In contrast with the past when states were the archetype actor in
international law, privatization and globalization have served to undermine the differences
29See Elvira Sojli & Wing Wah Tham, The Impact of Foreign Government Investments on Corporate Performance:
Evidence from the U.S., SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK at 2 (June 2, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id¼1540555.
30See Epstein & Rose, supra note 8, at 114 n. 9 (describing various sovereign wealth fund definitions).
31See Slawotsky, supra note 13, at 1239 (noting that SWFs derive their funds from foreign exchange derived profits
on exports).
32Slawotsky, supra note 13, at 1239 (noting different types of SWFs designed for various purposes).
33See Joel Slawotsky, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Jurisdiction Under the FSIA, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 967, 974 (2009)
(noting that the purpose and character of a sovereign wealth fund’s investments, along with its corporate
governance, may impact its ability to claim sovereign immunity).
34See Rafael Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigm, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 627, 629 (2011)
(analyzing the changes in international law).
35Backer, supra note 2, at 1273.
36See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1574–75 (2011).
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between state and private actors.37 Exemplifying the new international law paradigm, SWFs
embody the obscuring of the traditional demarcation between state and private actor roles and of
the convergence of public and private law.38
At their core, SWFs are creations of states.39 As such, they benefit from their status as government
actors and enjoy tax-exempt status in the United States.40 However, the role of SWFs as private
market participants has legal implications, such as removal of foreign sovereign immunity.41 It is this
dual nature of SWFs which exemplifies the blurring of the historical distinctions between public and
private actors.42 Moreover, it is this blending of state and private statuses that gives rise to concerns
over potential non-financial motivational investment. As stated by Larry Backer:
It is clear that SWFs represent a multifaceted nexus point for the convergence of public
and private law. On the one hand, SWFs encompass attempts by states to participate in
global markets like private individuals. On the other hand, SWFs may govern by other
means. SWFs potentially allow states to convert private markets into public arenas through
which they might project political and regulatory power abroad.43
SWFs provide an avenue for states to advance their particular international law agenda.44
The Norwegian SWF has been particularly apt at projecting its sponsor state’s international law
agenda.45 Various companies can be excluded from the list of SWF investment options as well as
being subjected to divestment based upon the recommendation of the Norwegian SWF’s Ethics
Council, which reviews companies based upon compliance with international law-based human
rights and ethics.46 The use of international law as a benchmark for investment decisions
represents an example of a state utilizing the private sector to promote its foreign policy.47
Moreover, it represents an inherent difference from private corporations who generally (if at all) do
not make business decisions based upon compliance with human rights or foreign policy. It is this
ability, and willingness, to advance a governmental agenda, rather than pursuing the pure profit
37See Slawotsky, supra note 1, at 2 (discussing the blurring of historical distinctions).
38See Joel Slawotsky, The Global Corporation as International Law Actor, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 79, 85 (2012) (“The world
is experiencing a unification of public and private actors in which private corporations are involved with traditionally
state obligations and the state is a player in private financial markets . . . This coalition of interests underscores the
blurring of the distinction between states and corporations.”).
39See Itai Trilnick, Israeli Cabinet Approves Plans for Sovereign Wealth Fund, HAARETZ (Apr. 15, 2013, 9:07 AM),
http://www.haaretz.com/business/israeli-cabinet-approves-plans-for-sovereign-wealth-fund.premium-1.515583
(“Legislation to establish a sovereign wealth fund, in which the state’s income from Israeli natural gas will be
stashed, was approved by the government yesterday, after the plan’s proponents managed to overcome vehement
opposition.”).
40See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (2009).
41See Slawotsky, supra note 33, at 974.
42See Slawotsky, supra note 38, at 79; Backer, supra note 1, at 10–11.
43Backer, supra note 1, at 59. International investment treaties present a further illustration that the lines of
differentiation between public and private are already clouded.
[S]ince most investment treaties and domestic investment statutes do not exclude state-owned
companies or sovereign wealth funds from their broad definitions of investors and investments, it is
entirely possible to have state actors on both sides of the dispute . . . . Conversely, it is also possible
to have non-state actors in interest on both sides of the dispute. This can happen where a state
delegates a governmental function to a non-state company, and then the company does something
that violates the state’s investment treaty or statutory obligations toward a foreign investor. Here the
international law principles on attribution come into play to transform the non-state company into a
state actor, thereby rendering the state liable for the company’s actions under international law. All of
these scenarios seem to undermine the utility of the strict state/non-state distinction between public
and private in international investment disputes.
Julie Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L.
367, 403–04 (2014) (emphasis added).
44See Backer, supra note 2, at 1280.
45On this level, SWFs unquestionably wield the capacity to influence global politics. It is important to note that
while the Norwegian SWF has in fact acted in an activist fashion for some time, this has been with regard to ethics-
based socially responsible investing. As will be discussed infra notes 176-186 and accompanying text, the Norwegian
SWF activism appears to be gravitating away from a narrow social based context to a more generally based style of
profit-focused activism.
46See, e.g., Ethics Council decisions infra 176–186.
47See Backer, supra note 2, at 1280 (“[T]he Norwegian Global SWF acts in a sovereign capacity. It deliberately
seeks to project Norwegian policy preferences on a host of private actors otherwise beyond its reach. It seeks to use
its investment strategies as a doorway to negotiate changes in foreign law.”).
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motive, that underscores the concerns over motivation.48 The next section will describe the
contextual anxieties over foreign corporate investment and government motivations both generally
and specifically in the United States.
B. National interest concerns and foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) has generally been viewed with great enthusiasm.49 However, global
economic and strategic challenges have led to increasing scrutiny of cross-border transactions.50
Governments have become more vocal in protecting local economic sectors and helping domestic
corporations in an attempt to prevent unemployment and recession.51 For example, Australia rejected
a takeover bid by a US company on national interest grounds. American agricultural giant Archer
Daniels Midland sought to acquire an Australian grain corporation; however, citing grounds of
national interest, the Australian Treasury Secretary opposed the transaction. “Treasurer Joe Hockey
said he was rejecting the proposal on national interest grounds after Australia’s Foreign Investment
Review Board failed to reach a consensus recommendation.”52
In the United States, CFIUS53 is an important mechanism54 used to detect and prevent foreign
entities transacting business with American companies that may damage national security.55
CFIUS balances the need for FDI with national security considerations evaluating business proposals
via a mechanism whereby an array of government agency representatives review a transaction and
decide whether to recommend approval, rejection or recommendation with modifications.56
Recent years have witnessed an increased level of CFIUS scrutiny.57 The Ralls matter provides an
illustration into the heightened apprehensions over foreign influence. In March 2012, Ralls,
a corporation owned by Chinese nationals, acquired interests in a wind farm project from Terna,
an American corporation. The proposed wind farm was adjacent to a restricted American military
zone. On September 28, 2012, President Obama delivered a Presidential Order banning the
acquisition and ownership in any form of the wind farm project by the Chinese connected parties,
based upon “credible evidence” indicating that the parties, “through exercising control of the
[companies,] might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United
States.”58 The order also directed Ralls to divest of its interests in the project within ninety days
and take down physical structures from the site within fourteen days.59
48Although exceptions may exist, private market participants are interested in profits as opposed to geo-political
interests.
49See Daniele Gallo, The Role of Law, The Rule of Law and the Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need For A
Greater External And Internal Activism Of The European Union, http://eprints.luiss.it/1295/1/WPG_01-14_Gallo.pdf (last
visited May 21, 2014) at page 4 (“As to the positive features characterizing SWFs as investors in the global economy,
there is no doubt that they contribute to both global growth and stability by maintaining an open flow of resources
for long-term investments.”).
50Id. at 8 (noting an increasing protectionist stance by recipient nations).
51See Nick Edwards & Kang Xize, China wealth fund eyes Asia “as Western protectionism rises”, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2012,
10:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/11/us-china-congress-cic-idUSBRE8AA01120121111 (noting a rise in
protectionist rhetoric in Western nations); see Katrin Bennhold, Urging Europe to Stay European, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/worldbusiness/22funds.html?_r¼0 (“With shares of some
prominent companies trading at beaten-down prices, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France suggested on Tuesday that
European leaders set up sovereign wealth funds to buy stakes in crucial industries to shield them from foreign raiders.”).
52See Lincoln Feast & Colin Packham, Australia surprises with rejection of $2.55 billion GrainCorp takeover by
ADM, YAHOO! FINANCE, Nov. 28, 2013, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/australia-surprises-rejection-2-55-225920266.html
(“The deal had been seen as the first test of the conservative government’s vow that Australia was ‘open for
business’ after the victory of Tony Abbott’s Liberal Party in elections in September.”).
53Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007).
54The current CFIUS regime was found to be problematic by the D.C. Court of Appeals in Ralls v. Obama, 758 F.3d
296 (D.C. Cir. 2014), thus raising the possibility the CFIUS regime will be amended or judicially curtailed.
55See Mark E. Plotkin, Foreign Direct Investment by Sovereign Wealth Funds: Using the Market and the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States Together to Make the United States More Secure, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART
88 (2008) (discussing the application of CFIUS to cross-border investments by SWFs).
56Id.
57COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN U.S., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
international/foreign-investment/Documents/2011%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL%20PUBLIC.pdf.
58See Order Regarding Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg.
60, 281 (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/28/order-signed-president-
regarding-acquisition-four-us-wind-farm-project-c.
59President Obama’s Order barred the parties from admittance to the project sites; from selling or conveying any
items produced by Sany to any third party for use on the project sites and from selling or conveying the project
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Other than the reference to “credible evidence,” the Presidential Order was devoid of any
explanation. Ralls filed suit challenging CFIUS’ and the President’s authority to block and unwind
the transaction alleging President Obama’s Order constituted violations of the Exon-Florio
Amendment (as well as the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)), and unconstitutionally deprived
Ralls of property without due process of law.60 The District Court of Columbia dismissed the suit
as moot.61
Ralls appealed and in an unprecedented order, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the constitutional
rights of Ralls were indeed violated.62 If the appeals court ruling remains, the clear import is that
the present CFIUS review process may potentially be altered either legislatively or judicially. At a
minimum, the Ralls saga demonstrates the scrutiny imposed on foreign deals, particularly when
defense and technology are involved.
In another example of heightened scrutiny, CFIUS closely examined the proposed transaction
between Chinese Lenovo and IBM to acquire IBM’s server business. CFIUS closely examined the
transaction as the US government was keenly interested. While the transaction was ultimately
approved,63 the scrutiny demonstrates the heightened national security concerns enveloping
review of foreign owners of strategic US businesses.
Lenovo Group Ltd. (LNVGY) must convince government officials that buying a server unit
from International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) won’t give China back-door access to
U.S. secrets and infrastructure. The wrinkle is that the Pentagon, the FBI and the nation’s
biggest telecommunications companies buy the IBM servers, according to people familiar
with the matter and an analysis by Bloomberg Industries.64
In another illustration, a privately owned company from the United Arab Emirates’ plan to invest in
a port “has resurrected an unfinished debate over foreign ownership of critical US infrastructure.”65
Even if the acquire is not itself “strategic,” proximity to a vital national interest will also generate
concern.66 Undoubtedly, foreign government-owned vehicles – such as SWFs – which want to
acquire United States business interests will garner close examination.
The next subsection will examine concerns over foreign investment in the context of SWF
transactions. These concerns stem from the exceptional nature of SWFs: while they are private
market actors, SWFs are state-owned and funded. This duality presents the potential of
investments that are not purely financially motivated and may instead include, primarily or
secondarily, ulterior aims such as the acquisition of military secrets, technological prowess or the
advancement of strategic goals not in the interests of the recipient host nation.
Footnote continued
companies to any other entity until all the structures were removed and CFIUS was advised and had the opportunity
to oppose any proposed recipient party.
60See Complaint, Ralls Corp. v. Barack H. Obama, No. 1-12-cv-01513 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2012). Subsequent to the
issuance of the Presidential Order, Ralls amended its complaint to include claims against the President.
See Amended Complaint, Ralls Corp. v. Barack H. Obama, No. 1-12-cv-01513 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
61See Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 926 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2013).
62See Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
63See Barinka & McLaughlin, supra note 16, (noting CFIUS approved the transaction).
64See David McLaughlin & Alex Barinka, Lenovo-IBM Deal Probed by U.S. Over Servers at Pentagon, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 4, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-04/lenovo-ibm-deal-probed-by-u-s-over-servers-at-
pentagon.html.
65See David Baumann, Middle Eastern Investment in Florida Port Rekindles Security Infrastructure Debate, FORBES
(Aug. 20, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2014/08/20/foreign-investment-in-florida-port-
rekindles-security-infrastructure-debate/ (“In a July 29 letter to Treasury Secretary Jack Lew—whose department
administers the CFIUS process—Hunter said this is the first time a ‘Middle Eastern company will fully operate a
US cargo terminal’ and called on CFIUS to determine whether it presents any risk to national security.”).
66Raymond Barrett & David Baumann, US Regulators To Examine Whether Smithfield Foods Sale Is Kosher, FORBES
(May 29, 2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2013/05/29/us-regulators-to-examine-whether-
smithfield-foods-sale-is-kosher/ (“As key US regulators review the deal, they’re likely to take a look at how close
Smithfield’s facilities are to military bases and other sensitive government locales.”). While the transaction was
approved, (see Shruti Date Singh & Bradley Olson, Smithfield Receives U.S. Approval for Biggest Chinese Takeover,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2013, 6:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-06/smithfield-receives-u-s-regulator-
approval-for-shuanghui-deal.html), the fact that a senate hearing was convened underscores the sensitivity in the
United States over such transactions. Simon Montlake, U.S. Senate Hearing On Smithfield Foods Poses Challenge To
CFIUS, FORBES (July 9, 2013, 11:49 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/simonmontlake/2013/07/09/u-s-senate-hearing-on-
smithfield-foods-poses-challenge-to-cifus/ (discussing Senate hearing).
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C. National security concerns in the context of SWF investments
SWFs, as hybrid actors consisting of both private market as well as government actor elements,
are under particularly strict scrutiny. The opacity of SWFs has been a key focus of Western critics,
who fear politically-driven investment decisions. Controversies and mistrust arise from conflicting
purposes of state capitalism and market capitalism.67 Such tension can be heightened by the lack
of transparency making it difficult to assess the SWFs’ activities and their impact on global capital
markets. The lack of a transparent and verifiable decision-making process, governance and
investment strategy has triggered considerable concerns among host countries.68
While SWFs have existed for decades,69 two primary factors have elevated their power and
profile in recent years: One, SWF assets, which are derived primarily from exports, have reached
staggering levels due to high energy prices and global trade imbalances.70 Wielding approximately
$6 trillion in assets, SWFs possess astounding wealth.71 These assets are expected to continue
rapidly growing and are estimated to rise above $8 trillion by 2016.72 Indeed, SWF assets are
currently nearly triple the assets of hedge funds, which in 2012 were about $2 trillion.73 Two,
although SWFs had historically invested in conservative debt instruments such as United States
Treasury bonds,74 commencing around 2006–2007, SWFs began venturing into global stock
markets.75 SWFs have continued diversifying their investments into a wide array of businesses.76
SWF investments now affect a broad range of blue-chip companies across the globe.77 Therefore,
potential SWF influence over global capital markets and portfolio companies is becoming more
prominent.
Parallel with SWFs’ expansion into global equities and other forms of assets, concerns arose in
recipient nations with respect to sovereign investment as potential national security threats.78
Many Western nations perceived that SWFs were acting as agents for their sovereign masters and
therefore had agendas in addition to the profit motivation.79 Investments by SWFs clearly raise
67See Doug Bandow, State capitalism versus free markets, WASHINGTON TIMES, June 28, 2010, http://www.washi
ngtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/28/state-capitalism-versus-free-markets/?page¼all (reviewing IAN BREMMER, THE END OF
THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES AND CORPORATIONS? (2010)) (discussing the economic and political
differences between the two models).
68Qingxiu Bu, China’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: Problem or Panacea? 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 849 (2010) (noting
concern over China’s CIC).
69See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 654 (“Since their inception in the 1950s, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have
dramatically expanded with the purpose of investing government revenue and maximizing returns for states with
surplus funds.“).
70See Slawotsky, supra note 13, at 1239 (“[O]il exporting nations and Asian exporters have accumulated a
staggering amount of assets due to high oil prices, globalization, and large global imbalances.”).
71Fund Rankings, SWF INSTITUTE (last visited Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/.
72Klaus Wille, Sovereign Funds’ Assets to Gain 60% by 2016, UBS’s Castelli Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2013, 8:33
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-13/sovereign-funds-assets-to-gain-60-by-2016-ubs-s-castelli-says.html
(“Sovereign wealth funds will increase their assets by 60 percent over the next three years, bolstered by rising
income from commodities and exports, according to UBS AG.”).
73Juliet Chung, Hedge-Fund Assets Rise To Record Level, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702304331204577354043852093400 (“Total hedge-fund assets surged to $2.13 trillion
at the end of the first quarter.”).
74See Slawotsky, supra note 13, at 1246 (“Traditionally, SWFs have had a low tolerance for risk, opting to invest in
government-guaranteed debt.”).
75Id. at 1246-47 (noting that SWFs acquired slices of trophy assets in the banking, technology and energy sectors).
76See Slawotsky, supra note 1, at 22 (noting examples of SWFs acquiring stakes in stock exchanges, water
providers, financial service institutions).
77See e.g., Morgan Stanley, Schedule 13G (Dec. 31, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
895421/000095012311013366/c12390sc13gza.htm (China’s SWF owns 10% of Morgan Stanley); Julia Werdigier, Qatar
Takes Profit on a Stake in Barclays, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/business/global/
21barclays.html?_r¼0 (Qatar owns almost 6% of Barclays); Qatar stakes in Siemens, Shell reflect drive to step up
development, REUTERS (May 23, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/23/shell-qatar-
idUSL5E8GE9P920120523 (buying shares in Siemens and Shell Oil); Tom Bill & Brenda Goh, Norway SWF close to
buying $1.7 billion UK mall stake – source, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/09/
uk-norges-meadowhall-idUKBRE8780XY20120809 (buying stake in mall); Kate Kelly, Morgan Stanley, Qatari Fund May
Do Commodities Deal, CNBC (July 20, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48241872 (buying investment bank’s
commodity unit); Abu Dhabi AMD stake raises concerns, TAIPEI TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
biz/archives/2007/11/18/2003388418 (Abu Dhabi ownership stake Advanced Micro devices).
78See Epstein & Rose, supra note 8, at 111 (noting heightened concerns in Western nations).
79See Bu, supra note 68 (noting concerns that SWF investments – particularly from undemocratic states – were
making investment decisions based at least in part on geo-political motivations).
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delicate issues with regard to market behavior, political and economic motivations, and the
protection of important national interests.80 The potential non-profits centric agenda exists since
SWFs are government-owned entities.81 Questions abound with respect to the motivations of
SWFs; specifically “relating to their impact on the stability of the international financial system and
whether or not such investments are commercially or strategically motivated.”82 Due to the wide-
ranging interests of their state backers, SWFs, could impinge upon the sovereign interests of
recipient nations’ economic and international policies. Financial “[m]arkets may become another
front in the political engagement among states.”83
Legendary financier Felix Rohytan noted that: “[SWFs] are making investments that they probably
think are O.K. but not spectacular . . . . [T]here has to be a political objective over and above the
rate of return . . . . You don’t need to appoint two directors to a board to have influence when you
own 10 percent of the company.”84
Foreign governments have indeed acted for non-financial reasons:
. . . to extract know-how . . . to increase competition and efficiency in the local market
. . . to obtain certification for the domestic market . . . and to exploit insider information.
We find evidence of technological transfer and increased competitiveness for China and
Singapore. There is supporting evidence for a certification effect in the case of United Arab
Emirates (UAE).85
Larry Backer has highlighted the intertwining of private market actors and state power in the form
of SWFs and the reality that governments can utilize their SWFs to achieve non-financial goals.
In the context of the Norwegian SWF’s ethics-based investment approach, he describes how a
state projects power and conducts international foreign policy through an SWF.86 The Norwegian
SWF thus provides an example of how a state actor can utilize a private market vehicle to project
policy and shape international law. The Norwegian SWF purposely attempts to influence the
policies of other nations through the private marketplace by using “its investment strategies as a
doorway to negotiate changes in foreign law, especially with respect to corporate social
responsibility.”87 This is evidenced by its actions of divestment.88
The potential for foreign state-owned SWFs to engage in behavior tinged with, or perhaps
primarily motivated by, a political agenda can increase when nations experience economic or
political tension. During times of increasing nationalism or geo-political strife, governmental
economic decisions may be more frequently based upon political considerations as opposed to
pure market considerations. In an example of mixing politics and business, Russian president
Vladimir Putin offered Ukraine cheap gas in return for the Ukraine joining an economic
federation with Russia.89 Indeed, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was willing to lose
money in its transactions with Cuba in order to advance the interests of its Cuban ally.
80See Amy Keller, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Trustworthy Investors or Vehicles of Strategic Ambition? An
Assessment of the Benefits, Risks and Possible Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 7 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 333
(2009); Lippincott, supra note 4, at 651-52 (noting the concerns that foreign nations may hold undue influence over
recipient nations).
81See Gallo, supra note 49, at 5 (citing the examples of Singaporean and Chinese governmental influence over
their SWF investments).
82Jeremy Leong, Domestic Constraints on Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Activity, THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND
INITIATIVE (2012), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/SWFI/,/media/Fletcher/Microsites/swfi/pdfs/2012/LeongFinal.pdf.
83See Backer, supra note 2, at 1274.
84Alex R. Sorkin, What Money Can Buy: Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/01/22/business/22sorkin.html?_r¼1&scp¼ l&sq¼%22what%C20money%C20can%C20buy%25&rst¼cse.
85Sojli & Tham, supra note 29, at 4.
86Backer, supra note 2, (analyzing the Norwegian SWF and how Norway engages in foreign policy through its
private actor SWF).
87Backer, supra note 2, at 1278.
88See infra examples of divestment. But see EARTH RIGHTS INT’L, BROKEN ETHICS: THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT’S INVESTMENTS IN
OIL AND GAS COMPANIES OPERATING IN BURMA (MYANMAR) (2010), [hereinafter BROKEN ETHICS], available at http://www.earthrights.
org/sites/default/files/documents/Broken-Ethics.pdf (criticizing the alleged hypocrisy of the Norwegian SWF because
the fund maintains investments in companies which have partnered with human rights abusers and corrupt local
politicians).
89See Irina Reznik & Henry Meyer, Russia Offers Ukraine Cheaper Gas to Join Moscow-Led Group, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 2, 2013, 8:29 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-01/russia-lures-ukraine-with-cheaper-gas-to-
join-moscow-led-pact.html (“Russia will offer cheaper natural gas to Ukraine if the government in Kiev opts to join a
Moscow-led economic bloc after halting free-trade talks with the European Union, according to First Deputy Prime
Minister Igor Shuvalov.”).
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The Soviet Union sold crude oil to Cuba at below market prices and purchased sugar from Cuba
at above market prices.90
In another example, in reaction to Belarus’ failure to repay its debt to the Russian government,
Russian gas supplier Gazprom threatened in 2007 to stop supplying the former Soviet Republic
with half of its natural gas requirements.91 Previously, in response to the Czech Republic’s granting
of permission to the US to install an anti-missile system in its territory, “mysterious technical
problems” resulted in reduced energy supplies from Russia.92 While those particular disputes have
been resolved, they illustrate the potential of mixing business and politics. In contrast to
governments, private actors would not be interested in extracting political concessions or
obtaining strategic leverage at the cost of lost profits.
A stellar illustration of the principle that government controlled private market actors are
potential conduits of government policy occurred in 2014 with regard to the disagreement between
Russia and the Ukraine.93 While Russian government controlled Gazprom initially claimed the
Ukraine owed it $2 billion – in the context of a geo-political dispute - that bill increased ten-fold
in a couple of months:
What Gazprom executives now say Ukraine owes them comes to more than $22 billion.
In early March, Gazprom put the bill at less than $2 billion. How Gazprom now calculates
its charges explains a lot about the way the company is used by the Kremlin for political
purposes. Behind the payment demands was a warning that Gazprom would cut off gas
supplies to Ukraine, which it has done at least twice before, in 2006 and 2009, over
political and financial disputes. And behind that warning is one to European countries that
largely depend on Russian gas supplies moving through Ukraine.94
State actors might also use their capital-rich SWFs through “soft-power” to obtain favorable
treatment from foreign governments. Victor Fleischer notes the possibility that the US
Government’s decision to save Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by diluting shareholder equity while
leaving debtholders relatively unscathed might have been partially related to the fact that China
was the largest debtholder for both companies.95 In another example, China may have lent money
to Costa Rica to persuade the country to sever ties with Taiwan:
A similar story took place in Costa Rica, which severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in
favor of the PRC in 2007. China financed Costa Rica’s National Stadium and patrol cars
for Costa Rica’s police force, as well as providing US$900 million in credit for the
expansion and remodeling of an oil refinery. On Xi Jinping’s recent visit, China
pledged a further US$400 million loan for road construction and public transportation
vehicles. Bilateral trade between Costa Rica and China reached US$6.17 billion
in 2012.96
90See Timeline: Post-Revolution Cuba, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/castro/timeline/index.html (last visited
Apr. 24, 2014) (“The Soviets agreed [in 1963] to purchase sugar at inflated prices while selling Cuba oil at deflated
prices. Also Cuba will receive free of charge all military equipment it requests.”).
91See Threat of Gas Supply Cuts Lifted After Belarus Pays Part of Debt to Gazprom, KYIVPOST (Aug. 3, 2007, 11:37
AM), http://www.kyivpost.com/content/world/threat-of-gas-supply-cuts-lifted-after-belarus-pay-27110.html.
92Davis Prosser’s Outlook: The Wind is Blowing the Wrong Way on Fuel Prices and a Cold Front is Coming,
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 30, 2008, at 50, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/david-prossers-
outlook-the-wind-is-blowing-the-wrong-way-on-fuel-prices-and-a-cold-front-is-coming-913397.html (noting “[a] dispute
with Ukraine two years ago led Russia to suspend gas exports to its neighbour, hitting supplies to the West which
depend on a major pipeline passing through the country. And this summer, shortly after the Czech Republic agreed
the US could install an anti-missile shield in the country, mysterious technical problems reduced the oil and gas it
received from Russia.”).
93See Steven Erlanger, Russia Ratchets Up Ukraine’s Gas Bills in Shift to an Economic Battlefield, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/world/europe/russia-ratchets-up-ukraines-gas-bills-in-shift-to-an-
economic-battlefield.html?hpw&rref¼business&_r¼2 (“Gazprom, the natural gas giant 50.01 percent owned by the
Russian government, keeps ratcheting up the bill for Ukraine, increasing the economic pressure on Kiev in tandem
with military pressure along Ukraine’s eastern border.”).
94Id.
95See Slawotsky, supra note 13, at 1255 (“SWFs also have the potential to succeed at forms of activism in which
private activist investors have had only mixed results. Professor Fleischer notes the possibility that the U.S.
Government’s decision to save Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the way that it did, diluting shareholder equity while
leaving debt holders relatively unscathed, might have been partially related to the fact that China was both
companies’ largest debt holder.”).
96Shannon Tiezzi, Why Taiwan’s Allies are Flocking to Beijing, THE DIPLOMAT, Nov. 19, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/
2013/11/why-taiwans-allies-are-flocking-to-beijing/.
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As vehicles of governments, SWFs maintain this potential for executing investment decisions
based upon geo-political interests. Pure private actor corporations would not offer to sell a
product cheaply in exchange for advancing a geo-political goal. Private actors are rarely, if at all,
interested in obtaining political favors or promoting ideological agendas. Conversely, it would be
surprising for some SWFs not to take into account some element of political interest particularly
during turbulent economic eras or tense regional conflict.97
Additionally, SWFs may enjoy informational advantages that may not be available to private
investors due to their relationships with their home governments.98 Such information could place
SWFs at a huge advantage if their home states possess information regarding investigations or
lawsuits involving a portfolio company or its competitors. Consider the potential for abuse if
foreign national intelligence agencies supply information to SWFs that was unavailable to private
investors.99 It is important to remember that these issues involve not only the competing interests
of SWFs and fellow shareholders, but also the competing interests of SWFs and the national
interests of the United States. Yet, despite the potential negative outcomes, “[h]ost states want to
encourage an influx of capital from commercially-minded SWFs while discouraging political
investments from others.”100 Western nations are concerned about SWFs but are in need of capital
to fund public sector debt and private commercial development.101
In responding to criticism and concerns over investment motivation and potential negative
protectionist measures, various proposals have been examined with respect to ensuring that SWFs
do not engage in conduct representing a threat to recipient nations’ economies or security.102
These proposals can be divided into two groups: One, the self-regulating “Santiago Principles”,
which are drafted voluntary codes of conduct on SWF internal governance and behavior.103
The other group consists of various suggested regulations including: limiting SWF share voting
rights;104 employing an EU-wide mechanism to screen non-EU SWF investment;105 invoking
international investment law106 and the creation of a new global tribunal designed to specifically
handle SWF disputes.107 Both self and external regulation are examined in the following section.
D. Regulating SWF investment
1. Self-regulation
In response to the recipient nation concerns, SWFs organized a working group of SWFs and issued
a series of guidelines known as the Santiago Principles in 2008. The guidelines –essentially an
effort at self-regulation – called for SWFs to establish:
a transparent and sound governance structure that provides for adequate operational
controls, risk management, and accountability . . . help maintain a stable global financial
system and free flow of capital and investment . . . operate on a good faith basis, and
invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations . . .
97If an SWF has truly independent investment decision makers that may substantially reduce the risk. However, a
political element cannot be dismissed since the investment managers may be dependent upon the government for
their appointments.
98See Slawotsky, supra note 13, at 1241.
99See Slawotsky, supra note 13, at 1251.
100See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 651.
101See Benjamin J. Cohen, Sovereign Wealth Funds and National Security: The Great Tradeoff, 85 INT’L AFFAIRS 713,
713 (2009) (“At issue are two competing goals. One is economic: the desire to promote material prosperity by
safeguarding opportunities for productive international investment. The other is political: the right and responsibility
of every government to defend the nation’s security.”).
102Some have argued that protective measures may violate international investment treaties. See Locknie Hsu,
SWFs, recent US legislative changes, and treaty obligations sovereign wealth funds, recent US legislative changes, and
treaty obligations, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 451, 451–77 (2009); See also Yvonne C. L. Lee, The Governance of Contemporary
Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 197, 205 (2010) (“protective measures arguably violate relevant provisions
in bilateral agreements that protect foreign investments in recipient countries under ‘national treatment’ and
‘most-favored-nation treatment’ principles.”).
103INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
“SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES] available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
104See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 5.
105See Gallo, supra note 49.
106See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 660–663.
107See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 678 (“Another possibility would be to form a new international body to hear
disputes pertaining to SWFs.”).
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[and ensure] compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements of the
countries in which they operate.108
The Santiago Principles are recognized as insufficient and “the governance or regulation of SWF
investments must tackle the issues underlying the absence of an international regime of oversight of
international financial markets.”109 While the principles are non-binding, vague and controversial,110
the Santiago Principles have generally been considered a positive introduction.111 Yet, remarkably, the
Santiago Principles concede the possibility of non-financially motivated investment. The Principles
tacitly acknowledge this practice, commenting that “[i]f investment decisions are subject to other
than economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy
and be publicly disclosed.”112 Naturally, it is doubtful an SWF would publicly disclose geo-political
based decisions. Moreover, these principles are non-enforceable “soft-law” drafted by SWFs and lack
a mechanism blocking non-financially motivated investment.
2. External regulation
Several proposals have floated with respect to the regulation of SWFs. One proposal advanced was to
remove the voting power of United States listed shares owned by SWFs during the time SWFs own
the shares.113 Ostensibly, this would reduce the ability of SWFs to unduly influence American
companies held by the SWF as the SWF would be powerless to elect directors.114 The proposal had
several self-acknowledged deficiencies, but in essence was proposed as a way to avoid the perceived
dangers of SWFs while simultaneously encouraging investment.115 Drawbacks include the potential
for similar retaliatory measures against US investors; the ability of SWFs to influence companies in
other ways; the ability of foreign states to influence companies without SWFs and the ability to
acquire voting rights through indirect ownership (i.e., derivative contracts, borrowed shares).116
Another suggestion calls on the EU to establish a US CFIUS style review system to evaluate non-EU
based SWF investment in EU nations.117 The proposal claims such a mechanism is necessary because
SWFs may attempt to influence EU member nations and/or exercise control over member EU member
industries as well as exercise control on a EU-wide level.118 According to the proponent, implementing
the proposal would reduce the risk that individual EU member states would enact harmful regulations
which may escalate into protectionism and the ebbing of crucial FDI.119
Another proposal invokes reliance on international investment treaty law to serve as a
“safety mechanism” providing both sides with a forum for resolving tensions between host state
protectionist measures taken with respect to SWF politically motivated investment. “Rather than deter
foreign investors like Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) with the threat of increased and uncertain
regulation, nations should rely on a well-established alternative dispute resolution body such as the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes to monitor and enforce accepted practices
of foreign investors.”120 According to this proposal, terms of an investment treaty121 would be violated
if the SWF attempted to use the investment for political ends.122
108International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds Presents the “Santiago Principles” to the International
Monetary and Financial Committee, INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, Oct. 11, 2008, supra, note 103, at
4, 5, 8, http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
109Lee, supra note 102, at 210.
110Lee, supra note 102, at 225.
111Lee, supra note 102, at 237 (“This demonstrates that SWF Principles constitute a credible starting point of
consultation, cooperation and coordination that can be effectively utilized by the relevant actors to achieve some
consensus in the controversial global economic realm.”).
112SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 103, at 8 (emphasis in original). Acknowledging that investment decisions may
indeed be non-financially based, the comments to the Principles state: “Some SWFs may exclude certain investments
for various reasons, including legally binding international sanctions and social, ethical, or religious reasons (e.g.,
Kuwait, New Zealand, and Norway). More broadly, some SWFs may address social, environmental, or other factors in
their investment policy. If so, these reasons and factors should be publicly disclosed.” Id. at 22.
113See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 5, at 1345.
114See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 5, at 1364–65.
115See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 5, at 1365–68.
116See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 5, at 1365–68.
117See Gallo, supra note 49.
118See Gallo, supra note 49.
119See Gallo, supra note 49.
120See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 660-66.
121The most popular international investment treaty is a bilateral investment treaty (BIT).
122See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 660-61.
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For example, it would be a violation of the BIT provisions for a government to bail out
a company because an SWF investor in that company threatened a deterioration of
other diplomatic relations with the government otherwise. This would be
discriminatory treatment of private investors without political ties. BITs could
also protect SWFs from host states regulating or disfavoring SWF investments in
order to sanction their sovereign owners by giving SWFs recourse for differential
treatment.123
The proposal notes that state-owned entities such as SWFs should be formally classified as
investors, otherwise a general BIT may be inapplicable as arbitration does not involve state-state
disputes but rather state-investor disputes.124
The Santiago Principles could also be codified in BITs. Including references to international
law (like the Santiago Principles) in the choice of law provisions of BITs would ensure
compliance with international investment standards. Backed up by an international
arbitration regime willing to enforce the terms of these BITs, this poses the strongest and
most immediate option for depoliticizing SWFs.125
Doing so would obviate the risk of protectionism and encourage cross-border flows of capital
while screening out ulterior motive-based investment. Another proposal is to “level the playing
field” by applying The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)126 which protects investors
in the services sector from discrimination. Invoking GATS could enable a claim for international
arbitration.127
Others have suggested there is no need for regulation: “a policy of watchful waiting is preferable
to any immediate effort to impose special restrictions on SWFs.”128 According to these advocates,
“to date there is little evidence that any SWF has actively sought to lever its investment positions
for either political or collateral business purposes.”129 Proponents of “no regulation” claim that
although SWFs could potentially use their influence to obtain collateral objectives, this is no
different than other non-SWF investors who act the same way, and therefore unique regulation of
SWFs is not required.130
In sum, while several regulatory suggestions have been made to date, only the self-regulatory
and non-enforceable Santiago Principles, (which do not bar non-financially motivated investment),
have been effectuated. The next section will discuss the phenomenon of activist investing, and in
particular, the increased prospects of SWFs to engage in activist investing.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF ACTIVIST INVESTING
Activist investing in American equity markets is not new. Surging to prominence in the 1980s,
activist investors commenced taking very aggressive approaches with publicly traded companies in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.131 The activist investor of the 1980s in the American markets was
likely a sole investor, a financial entrepreneur, whose stated goals were to shakeup a corporation
and unlock shareholder value.
It has been a busy few weeks for Carl Icahn, the billionaire financier who gained fame–
some would say notoriety– in the 1980s by taking over Trans World Airlines (TWA) and
agitating for change at the likes of Texaco and RJR Nabisco.132
Another legendary activist shareholder is T. Boone Pickens who was involved in numerous
corporate takeover disputes such as with Newmont Mining and Unocal Oil. Pickens was so
123See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 661.
124Lippincott, supra note 4, at 663.
125See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 662.
1261869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1994).
127See Lippincott, supra note 4, at 663–64.
128Epstein & Rose, supra note 8, at 113.
129Epstein & Rose, supra note 8, at 116.
130Epstein & Rose, supra note 8, at 123–28.
131See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1274–81
(2008) (discussing the historical transition of influence on corporate activities from a company’s management to its
shareholders, particularly through the advent of activist hedge funds).
132Barbara Kiviat, 10 Questions for Carl Icahn, TIME, Feb. 15, 2007, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1590446,00.html#ixzz2n6erdR7o.
Page 14 of 33
Slawotsky. International Review of Law 2015:swf.8
notorious that he was selected as Time Man of the Year in 1985.133 The shareholder activism, and
the lawsuits such investments spawned, significantly impacted American corporate law. Numerous
seminal judicial decisions were ultimately delivered as a result of litigation undertaken by activist
shareholders or corporate boards.134 These rulings reinforced the corporate governance model of
shareholder-value capitalism.135
A. The increasing use of activist investing by large funds
Activist investing has enjoyed a robust resurgence in recent years.136
The new activists have dramatically upped the pressure on corporate executives and
boards. Nearly every business day they target another company . . . Their game is simple:
They buy stocks they view as undervalued and pressure management to do things they
believe will raise the value, such as giving more cash back to shareholders or shedding
divisions that they think are driving down the stock price. With increasing frequency they
get deeply involved in governance—demanding board seats, replacing CEOs, and
advocating specific business strategies.137
There is a vigorous conflict of opinion as to whether activist investors are beneficial or detrimental
to shareholders and companies. Some argue that activist investing focuses on short term results
and is damaging to the economy of the United States and its equity markets.138 According to
detractors of activist investing, “the power of the activist hedge funds is enhanced by their
frequent success in proxy fights and election contests when companies resist the short-term steps
the hedge fund is advocating.”139 Activist opponents also note that “[a]ctivist hedge funds have
recently exploited loopholes in existing U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules
under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act to accumulate significant, control-influencing
stakes in public companies rapidly without timely notice to the market.”140
Proponents of activist investing believe that shareholder value is significantly increased by
activism.
Because institutional investors ultimately decide whether an activist’s campaign will
succeed, activism potentiates institutional voice by putting choices to the institutions . . . .
So in sidelining activist investors, the United Kingdom and the European Union are also
133See TIME Magazine Cover: T. Boone Pickens, TIME, http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19850304,00.html
(last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
134See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (upholding directors’ defensive
measures such as a large dividend distribution and a new standstill agreement to thwart activist investor since
shares were valued more than the offer); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (upholding directors’
authorization of a large share buyback funded by new debt to thwart activist investor since shares were valued more
than the offer); Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (finding director misconduct in failing to
seek highest price available).
135The United States model is shareholder centric as opposed to a stakeholder model. See Joel Slawotsky,
Sustainable Capitalism: Revelations from the Japanese Model, 2012 HASTINGS L.J. VOIR DIRE 10, http://www.hastings
lawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/Slawotsky-Voir-Dire.pdf. The rulings cited supra note 134 reflect this shareholder
based corporate governance model. In contrast, Norway’s ethics based methodology is not solely designed to
enhance shareholder value but rather to enforce corporate compliance with Norway’s notions of social responsibility.
This reflects Norway’s stakeholder corporate governance system. See Roger Blanpain, William Bromwich & Olga
Rymkevich, RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FROM SHAREHOLDER VALUE TO STAKEHOLDER VALUE 121 (2011) (Norway has a
stakeholder model of governance as opposed to a shareholder model). Interestingly, Norway appears to be shifting
towards a broadening scope of activism to include shareholder value. See infra notes 187–195.
136David Bogoslaw, Icahn’s new megaphone for shareholder activism, CORPORATE SECRETARY, Oct. 25, 2013, http://www.
corporatesecretary.com/articles/proxy-voting-shareholder-actions/12567/icahns-new-megaphone-shareholder-activism/
(describing the increasing popularity of shareholder activism).
137Bill George & Jay W. Lorsch, How to Outsmart Activist Investors, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (May 2014),
http://hbr.org/2014/05/how-to-outsmart-activist-investors/ar/1.
138See Robert Lenzner, The Hedge Fund Activists Are Not The Flavor Of The Month For The Chief Justice Of The
Delaware Court, FORBES, Mar. 30, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2014/03/30/activist-hedge-fund-
corporate-meddlers-take-it-in-the-chops-from-the-high-and-mighty/ (noting how the Chief Justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court criticizes hedge fund activists and “questions why the directors and managers of large public
corporations ‘must follow the immediate whim of a momentary majority of shareholders’ tempted by the activists into
some short-term adventure that could push the stock up.”).
139Martin Lipton, Current Thoughts About Activism, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION (Aug. 9, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/09/current-thoughts-about-activism/
#more-50945.
140Id.
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sidelining the institutions—just those whose roles are simultaneously sought to be
expanded into stewardship.141
Regardless of whether activist investing is beneficial or detrimental, the fact remains that activist
investing is a popular tactic.142 Activist investors have a variety of available strategies. At times,
activists take stakes with the intent (or hope) of forcing a White Knight to save the company by
entering the fray and making a generous offer.143 Sometimes, activists take a stake and want to
break up the company because they believe the company’s parts are worth more than the
whole.144 The strategy of Greenmail – the buying of shares often accompanied by litigation or
threats of the same – is deigned to force the management to buy the shares back from the
investor at a premium.145 “Hushmail” is the practice of the activist withdrawing their corporate
governance concerns in return for the company buying their shares.146 Activists also at times
attempt to influence a corporation to issue dividends.147
Private financiers were the archetype activist investors in the 1980s and 1990s, and large
institutions did not generally participate in activist investing (although the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association –
College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) did commence using socially responsible investing
benchmarks in the 1970s and 1980s).148 While large institutions traditionally refrained from
engaging in activist investing, large institutional funds are turning increasingly active. Once the
purview of solo activists such as Icahn and Pickens, activist investing has become mainstream and
constitutes an accepted investment strategy. Moreover, this institutional activism has shifted from
the socially responsible context of CalPERS and TIAA-CREF to a more profit-centric model.
Activist investors like Carl C. Icahn, Daniel S. Loeb and William A. Ackman are getting
deep-pocketed imitators. Some of the biggest public pension funds, which have sought to
influence companies for years, are now starting to emulate these investors by engaging
with, and sometimes seeking to oust, directors of companies whose stock they own.149
141See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 12, at 906.
142See, e.g., Abram Brown, Icahn Wants A Seat For Himself On Dell’s Board; Activists Unveil Proposed Directors,
FORBES (May 14, 2013, 8:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013/05/14/icahn-wants-a-seat-for-himself-
on-dells-board-activists-unveil-proposed-directors/ (DELL); Ian Sherr & David Benoit, Carl Icahn Uses Twitter to Say
He Took ‘Large’ Bite of Apple Stock, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2013, 8:02 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324085304579010971386703480 (AAPL).
143Bryan Rich, Watsa’s Blackberry Bid May Not Be The Last One, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013, 10:03 AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/09/24/billionaire-watsas-blackberry-bid-may-not-be-the-last-one/.
144Mark Scott, Activist Investor Seeks Breakup of UBS, DEALBOOK (May 2, 2013, 7:18 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2013/05/02/activist-investor-seeks-breakup-of-ubs/?_r¼0.
145Michael Parrish, Occidental Ends Lawsuits Over Cost of Buyout: Settlement: Oxy will pay $3.65 million to
shareholders who objected to the price David Murdock got for his shares in 1984, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992, http://
articles.latimes.com/1992-03-21/business/fi-4044_1_david-murdock. The practice of Greenmail has been reduced due
to regulations imposed to discourage this practice. But the line between Greenmail and Hushmail is often not clear.
146See Mark D. Gerstein, Hushmail: Are Activist Hedge Funds Breaking Bad?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (July 7, 2014, 9:08 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/07/07/hushmail-
are-activist-hedge-funds-breaking-bad/#1 (Describing the phenomenon of “hush money” being paid to activist
investors who no longer want to own the company’s shares and sell the shares back to the company at a slight
premium or discount to avoid dumping the shares and incurring losses. Following the transaction “the activist may
enter into a standstill and non-disparagement agreement with the target.”)
147Elisabeth Behrmann & Yuriy Humber, Transocean Reaches $1.1 Billion Dividend Accord With Icahn, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 11, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-11/transocean-reaches-accord-with-icahn-on-
dividend-plan-and-board.html.
148See CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY (2012), available at
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/pubs/esg-report-2012.pdf (describing CalPERS’ efforts at sustainable
investing including climate change, environmental and labor); Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), TIAA-CREF, https://
www.tiaa-cref.org/public/about-us/investing/responsible-investing-ri (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (“In the early 1970s,
we became one of the first institutional investors to engage with companies on social issues. We believe that
effective social responsibility policies may help companies manage risk and improve financial performance . . .
Where appropriate, we incorporate Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations into the selection and
monitoring of our investments across a variety of asset classes and products, including our responsible investment
funds, community and impact investing programs, alternative investments, real estate, as well as the individual
portfolios that we offer at our clients’ request.”).
149See Randall Smith, Some Big Public Pension Funds Are Behaving Like Activist Investors, http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2013/11/28/some-big-public-pension-funds-are-behaving-like-activist-investors/?_r.0 November 28, 2013.
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Large institutional pension and private hedge funds have become extensive participants in profits-
centric activist investing: “Calpers is one of several big United States public funds that have played
roles in shareholder uprisings in recent years.”150 Large pension funds have become activists and
played roles in break-ups of companies and forcing director resignations.151 Activist funds wielding
large pools of capital such as hedge funds can substantially influence a corporation:152
[Hedge funds] target companies, take large positions in their stock, criticize their business
plans and governance practices, and confront their managers, demanding action that
enhances shareholder value. When one hedge fund announces a five or ten percent
position in a company, others follow, forming a “wolf pack” that sometimes has the voting
power to force management to address its demands.153
Activist hedge funds are increasingly taking on corporate managers and demanding the companies
act to enhance shareholder value.
Taking advantage of regulatory changes and a public mood, oriented toward rooting out
corporate misdeeds, a growing number of hedge fund managers have taken up Mr. Icahn’s
tactics to wage populist battles against chief executives. In letters, often colorfully worded,
tacked on to filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, they are demanding that
executives sell off units, pay dividends or take other actions to raise stock prices quickly.154
As more large funds – including pension funds – become activist, it seems to be merely a question of
time before SWFs also join the ranks of large institutions that engage in activist investing.155
Until recently, SWFs did not engage in activist strategies.156 As previously discussed, in 2006-2007
SWFs commenced diversifying their assets from stable governmental debt obligations to a variety of
investment allocations.157 Parallel with global investment diversification, questions arose with respect
to SWF motives. SWFs were concerned that recipient nation governments would act to block SWF
investment which served to obviate any activist leanings. “Agitating for change at foreign companies
leaves [SWFs] open to accusations that it is interfering inappropriately in the affairs of other countries.
That charge has mostly been levelled at sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from the Middle East and Asia
that have taken high-profile stakes in Western companies.”158
SWFs thus embarked on a campaign outlining their role as passive investors assuring
governments that their motivations were purely financial to avoid regulatory action. “SWFs have
typically been cautious passive investors, a judicious strategy in the past considering the potential
in both the U.S. and Europe for intensified regulatory interest in how the investment arms of
foreign governments buy up domestic properties.”159 This passive strategy served to detract from
the argument that SWFs were Trojan investors looking for opportunities to advance their national
interests. Illustrative of the passive nature of SWFs, is a Wall Street Journal article from 2007 that
describes SWFs as “taking small stakes” in various companies and being “quiet.”160 As recently as
150Id.
151Id.
152Juliet Chung & David Benoit, Activist Investors Build Up Their War Chests, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2014, 11:01 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/articles/daniel-loebs-third-point-raised-2-5-billion-in-two-weeks-1410458404 (“CEOs, beware: Activist investors
who target America’s corporations are gathering more ammunition. A number of the largest activists are raising billions of
dollars, in an effort to take advantage of their increasing clout in boardrooms and above-average hedge-fund returns.”).
153William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1379 (2007).
154Riva D. Atlas, Some Funds Taking Role Far Beyond Just Investor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/08/16/business/16invest.html?adxnnlx¼1124197489-TzwLymvE924SNb1lQwP/CA&pagewanted¼all&_r¼0.
Sometimes the activists seek board seats. Katya Kazakina, Billionaire Loeb Confirmed as Sotheby’s New Board Member,
BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2014 9:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-29/billionaire-loeb-confirmed-as-sotheby-
s-new-board-member.html (“Billionaire hedge-fund manager Dan Loeb was confirmed as Sotheby’s (BID) newest director
following a closely watched proxy fight between the auction house and its largest shareholder. Loeb and five others were
officially appointed to the board today at Sotheby’s annual shareholder meeting in New York. The activist investor sat in the
front row of the room. His Third Point LLC owns 9.65 percent of Sotheby’s shares, according to a regulatory filing.”).
155Norway’s SWF has engaged in socially responsible activist investing although as noted infra notes 176–186, the
fund is beginning to engage in a shareholder value model of activist approach.
156With limited exceptions. See Norway’s ethics based decisions infra notes 176–186 and accompanying text.
157See Slawotsky, supra, note 13, at 1246–47.
158Alexander Smith, Norway SWF Wages Lone Governance Crusade, REUTERS, Oct. 8, 2009, http://blogs.reuters.com/
breakingviews/2009/10/08/norway-swf-wages-lone-governance-crusade/.
159Levick, supra note 11.
160See Chip Cummins & Rick Carew, The New Deal Diplomacy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB119621328472106044.
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2010, scholars noted “[a]dditional evidence of a passive role of SWFs is offered in an analysis of
engagement and voting by SWFs presented . . . which finds ‘few cases in which SWFs held seats
at their portfolio companies’ and that ‘the funds appear to stick to their claims that they are
relatively passive investors.’”161
As outlined above, since investing in global markets, SWFs have generally avoided activist
behavior. However, recent developments suggest that the era of SWF acquiescence to passivity
and/or to corporate governance mishaps is ending. This transition is normal and expected and in
fact SWFs admit to this likelihood.162 In the coming years, SWFs will become more active, and
their ownership of flagship international corporations could allow them to influence corporate
boards in dramatic ways, radically transforming corporate governance.163 Recent SWF conduct
indicates an emergent shift to a more activist position. The nascent SWF investor activism, while at
an incipient stage, will likely strengthen and the trend has serious implications. The transference in
SWF behavior is discussed in the next section.
B. The turn in SWF behavior
SWF activism is now awakening. The might and financial power of SWFs on an individual fund
level is tremendous. Coupled with other SWFs, the combined financial power of these state-owned
funds is astounding. For all large investors, it is expected that they will seek to obtain influence in
order to protect and advance their financial stake in a business. It is thus not surprising that state
actor SWFs also seek the same sway.
Shareholder activism is increasing everywhere and SWFs are no different. These funds are
likely to insist that the companies in which they invest are managed more carefully in the
future. Sovereign investing may, in the future, redefine the meaning of shareholder activism
the way SWFs have begun to redefine the character of state investment in economic
markets abroad.164
As noted by Larry Backer:
[T]hat Norway is acting as a sovereign through its Global Fund and in private markets, and
is doing so aggressively, does not mean that SWFs ought to be viewed as a threat any
greater than large private investment vehicles that also aggressively intervene in regulatory
matters.165
In other words, SWFs, as large capital rich investors, can be projected to duplicate the conduct
of other large investors such as hedge funds. SWF activism is a normal and foreseeable
development. The following subsections provide examples of increased SWF activism.
1. General: Board seats
During the initial phase of SWF investments in global stock markets, SWFs were generally careful
not to seek board seats. This is understandable as SWFs presented themselves as passive
investors and board seats provide opportunities to substantially influence a business.166
When analyzing the potential influence of the SWFs on their portfolio companies, one key
factor is whether the funds seek board seats at the companies in which they invest.
Seeking board seats suggests a significant level of active investment behavior, and in such
cases, the fund is likely to have more influence on how the company is managed.167
161Bernardo Bortolotti & Veljko Fotak et al., Quiet Leviathans: Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment, Passivity, and the
Value of the Firm 28 (Working Paper), available at http://www.ltic.org/IMG/pdf/Working_Paper_Quiet_Leviathans_
Venice_Forum2010.pdf at page 28.
162However, “taking a more active role in investments [might not be] uncommon for large funds, and might
perhaps become a necessity when shareholdings grow as large as CalPERS’s or Kuwait’s.” See Kuwait Investment
Office in London, KUWAIT INVESTMENT AUTHORITY, http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/KIO/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Apr. 24, 2014).
163See Slawotsky, supra note 13, at 1240-41.
164See Nili, supra note 2.
165Backer, supra note 2, at 1280.
166See Afshin Mehrpouya & Chaoni Huang et al., An Analysis of Proxy Voting and Engagement Policies and
Practices of the Sovereign Wealth Funds, IRRC INSTITUTE 21 http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Sovereign_Wealth_Funds_
Report-October_2009.pdf, at 21 (“We found few cases in which SWFs held seats at their portfolio companies.
Especially following the current focus on the SWFs practices, the funds appear to stick to their claims that they are
relatively passive investors, simply relying on the standard voting procedures in order to manage their stakes.”).
167Id.
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In contrast to initially refraining from doing so, SWFs have begun to demand board seats as
exemplified by the Libyan SWF’s efforts.168 Qatar Holding has also been a leader with respect to
obtaining board seats.
It is a matter of national pride that Qatar Holding has taken board seats at big companies,
from the owners of Heathrow and Canary Wharf in the UK to Credit Suisse and
Volkswagen, making decisions that are relevant to some of the world’s most prominent
companies. The board seats are seen as a way to groom the next generation that is now
taking over.169
In another example, “two Qatari directors have taken their seats on Heathrow’s board following
the Gulf state’s sovereign wealth fund Qatar Holding’s purchase of 20 per cent of BAA for £900
million last year.”170 A further illustration of the Qatari drive for board seats:
Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund may seek a supervisory board seat and strategic partnership
with Lagardere, potentially deepening its ties with the French media-to-aerospace
conglomerate in which it is the biggest shareholder.171
Other examples of SWFs obtaining seats include Singapore’s Government Investment Corporation
(GIC), which invested in Indian healthcare company Vasan and in return was given a board seat.172
Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Investment Company, a pre-existing shareholder in chipmaker Advanced
Micro Devices since 2008, increased its stake in 2012 in return for an additional board seat.173
It is noteworthy that only a few years ago, SWFs did not actively seek directorships in portfolio
companies. The envisaged change has expeditiously occurred; within a few years of asset
diversification into equities, SWFs are already demanding seats in the boardroom.
2. SWF specific: Qatar
At the forefront of this emerging SWF activist era stands Qatar Holding. In February 2012, Glencore
International PLC proposed a merger with Xstrata wherein each Xstrata shareholder would tender
their Xstrata share and receive 2.8 shares in Glencore. The transaction received the approval of
Xstrata’s board of directors. Qatar Holding, an existing shareholder, began actively buying
additional Xstrata shares and eventually acquired a 12 percent stake. Under the terms of the
transaction, the deal required approval of 75 percent of the non-Glencore held shares’ approval,
thus necessitating Qatar Holdings approval. Rather than simply acquiesce, Qatar Holding insisted
upon higher compensation. After meetings between Qatar Holding and Glencore, Glencore did in
fact agree to raise its offer to 3.05 shares. The Xstrata board recommended approval and the
shareholders did, in fact, approve the transaction.
The pivotal role played by Qatar Holding in obtaining better terms for Xstrata shareholders
personified the quintessential activist shareholder. However, the activist role had previously been
the province of hedge and other large funds and private investors – but not SWFs. “It is therefore
168See Giovanni Legorano, Libya Wealth Fund to Request UniCredit Board Seat, MARKETWATCH (June 20, 2012,
12:46 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/libya-wealth-fund-to-request-unicredit-board-seat-2012-06-20 (“Libya’s
sovereign-wealth fund will ask for a seat on UniCredit SpA’s board, the fund’s president said Wednesday, after the
term of the member representing Libyan interests expired last month.”).
169Camilla Hall & Simeon Kerr et al., Qatar: What’s next for the world’s most aggressive deal hunter?, FINANCIAL TIMES
(July 4, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/dc99ef1e-de45-11e2-9b47-00144feab7de.html#slide0.
170See Rob Gill, Al Baker Takes Seat on Heathrow’s Board, BUYING BUSINESS TRAVEL, Feb. 11, 2013, http://buying
businesstravel.com/news/1120331-al-baker-takes-seat-heathrow’s-board (“Al Baker and Ali Bouzarif, from Qatar
Investment Authority, have both been appointed as non-executive directors of Heathrow Airport Holdings, formerly
known as BAA, according to filings at Companies House.”).
171See Qatar Sovereign Wealth Fund Eyes Board Seat At Lagardere, ARAB TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, http://www.arabtimes
online.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/178034/reftab/36/t/Qatar-sovereign-wealth-fund-eyes-board-
seat-at-Lagardere/Default.aspx; see also Southern Arc Announces Results From Annual General Meeting, Including
Changes to Board of Directors and Executive Team, YAHOO! FINANCE (Nov. 8, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/
news/southern-arc-announces-results-annual-120000264.html (“Mr. Al-Obaidli was nominated in place of Mohammed
Al-Shahwani, CEO of Qatar Mining Company (‘Qatar Mining’), as a Director. Mr. Al-Obaidli is the Chief Investment
Officer of Qatar Mining, which purchased a 9.99% interest in Southern Arc in June 2011 through its subsidiary,
Tadeen Cyprus.”).
172See Singapore’s GIC invests $100m in Vasan Healthcare, TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 15, 2012, 1:35 AM), http://timesof
india.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Singapores-GIC-invests-100m-in-Vasan-Healthcare/articleshow/12269154.
cms (“GIC will be offered one seat on the company’s board.”).
173See Ian King, AMD Rises as Mubadala Investment Eases Liquidity Concerns, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2012, 3:19 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-03/amd-rises-as-mubadala-investment-eases-liquidity-concerns.html.
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something of a watershed moment when an SWF acts like an activist shareholder, which is
precisely what Qatar did when it rejected Glencore’s offer.”174 Qatar Holding’s activist approach
with respect to the merger heralds a new activist age for SWFs.
3. SWF specific: Singapore
Singapore’s Temasek also has recently demonstrated a shift in behavior. For example, Temasek
owned 18 percent of Standard Chartered but was not satisfied with corporate governance at the
company. Rather than remain silent, Temasek commenced efforts at instituting governance
changes. “Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd., the Singapore state investment company that is the biggest
shareholder of Standard Chartered STAN.LNþ0.56% PLC, has been expressing its discomfort with
the bank’s governance and is pressuring it to appoint more independent directors, people familiar
with the investment company said.”175 Singaporean SWFs appear poised to raise their level of
conduct with respect to corporate governance.
4. SWF specific: Norway
Yet another example of the behavioral shift is Norwegian activism. Norway’s SWF has long been
involved in engaging with companies in the corporate social responsibility context opting to divest
from portfolio companies based on principles of human rights and ethics.176 Norway’s SWF has
acted in a proactive fashion for years and is known for its strong social stances on a variety of
issues, taking a “socially responsible” approach to investing.177 Corporate social responsibility, in
the form of exercising shareholder rights, is an important element of the investment strategy of the
Norwegian SWF.178 “Responsible investing focuses on good corporate governance and ethics as a
basis for developing portfolio and investment strategies.”179
The ethics guidelines, including an evaluation of alleged international law violations committed
by portfolio companies, are overseen by a Council of Ethics.180
The Ethical Guidelines are based on two premises. The first is that the Fund must be
managed to extract a “sound return in the long term.” The second is that the first objective
is contingent on a number of policy factors, including “sustainable development in the
economic, environmental and social sense.”181
Norway’s SWF is a private market participant seeking profit maximization yet it has a strong
political dimension.182 Therefore, the Norwegian SWF may be conflicted.183 For example, usually
the SWF accepts the Ethics Council recommendations and divests from or excludes companies.184
Yet, other times, the SWF apparently chooses to remain invested despite the Ethics Council
174Levick, supra note 11.
175P. R. Venkat & David Enrich, Singapore Slings Arrows at Bank, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10000872396390443768804578034210943017432.
176See Council on Ethics, NORWAY GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION SERVICES, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-
rad-utvalg/ethics_council.html?id¼434879 (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
177See Backer, supra note 2, at 1276 (noting there is some effort to separate the SWF investment functions from
the political functions of the state organs that have oversight responsibility. The division of authority between the
Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank is governed by a Management Agreement. Norges Bank’s management
established the Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) on January 1, 1998 as an operational investment
management unit for the Global Fund, which hires outside managers to direct some of its investment activities.
The Norges Bank Executive Board supervises the operations of NBIM).
178Backer, supra note 2, at 1278.
179Backer, supra note 2, at 1276.
180Companies Excluded from the Investment Universe, NORWAY MINISTRY OF FINANCE, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/
fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsible-investments/companies-excluded-from-the-investment-u.
html?id¼447122 (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
181Backer, supra note 2, at 1277.
182Backer, supra note 2, at 1277–78 (The Norwegian SWF’s “investment policy is driven by political interests.
I note three examples: (1) corporate social responsibility; (2) sanctions against Israel; and (3) investment in Burma.
The three suggest the way in which public and private interest may merge, and the way in which, as some critics
fear, public policy can be deployed within markets.”).
183Backer, supra note 2, at 1277–78 (“The governance and activities of the Norwegian SWF produces a curious
tension . . . the maximization of shareholder value in this case requires the Fund be used to affect the global
governance goals of the Norwegian state.”).
184See, e.g., supra note 180. See also Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, Norway’s Oil Fund Excludes Five Companies from
Investment, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2013, 3:56 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20131014-700632.html (noting
excluded companies were involved in environmental abuse as well as child labor).
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recommendation.185 The ethics based investing scheme is not without criticism of acting in a
subjective and perhaps in a hypocritical fashion.186
Significantly however, the Norwegian SWF has now embraced a non-human rights based activist
modus. The SWF has embarked on a “muscle-flexing” path towards a more activist role with
respect to governance expanding the parameters of decisions beyond social responsibility.187
The Norwegian SWF is thus moving towards a more customary form of profits-centric shareholder
value activism. The Norwegian SWF is starting to conduct itself – albeit on a limited level – as a
conventional activist investor. “Norway’s sovereign-wealth fund, a big shareholder in some U.S.
companies, is pushing to make it easier to replace directors at firms, including Wells Fargo WFC -
0.95% & Co., over concerns about financial performance and governance.”188 The Norwegian SWF
submitted binding shareholder proposals regarding proxy access rights to the Charles Schwab
Corporation, Wells Fargo, CME Group, Inc., the Western Union Company, Staples, Inc. and Pioneer
Natural Resources Co.189 The proposals demanded a change to the company’s bylaws to authorize
shareholders who have collectively held at least 1 percent of the company’s shares for at least one
year to nominate individuals representing up to 25 percent of the company’s board of directors
whenever there is any election of directors.190 Significantly, the statements contained links to the
SWF website which levied substantial criticisms of the governance of the companies.191
The Norwegian SWF appears to be laying the groundwork for becoming a demanding
activist shareholder. Norges Bank Investment Management isn’t demanding board changes
or its own representation at the companies just yet . . . [n]or is it demanding strategic or
business changes. But if the boards aren’t becoming more accountable to shareholders,
“we will nominate directors. We are not planning that now; we would much rather have a
good dialogue with the board.”192
The groundwork has advanced meaningfully with Norway’s announcement that a board will be
formed for its SWF – “a corporate governance advisory board in an attempt to be a more active
investor.”193 The appointment of the board marks a dramatic turning point, as the SWF clearly is
on the path to an activism not based upon corporate social responsibility. “The move will enable
the Norwegian fund to advise on ownership issues when companies go through major strategy
changes, takeovers or capital restructuring.”194
The more consequential aspect of the more hands-on approach, however, could be in the
corporate governance sphere. Norway’s SWF will use its heft to influence how the
businesses it partly owns are run. It now sits on Volvo’s director nomination committee.
185See Oil fund won’t exclude PetroChina, NEWS IN ENGLISH, Dec. 8, 2011, http://www.newsinenglish.no/2011/12/08/oil-
fund-wont-exclude-petrochina/ (“The Norwegian government is ignoring a recommendation from a state ethics council
that it ban investments by Norway’s oil fund in the Chinese oil company PetroChina. Meanwhile, a Chinese
shipbuilding company is making inroads on Norway’s west coast.”).
186Norway’s SWF ethics based investing has been criticized. See Jonathan Watts, Norway Accused of Hypocrisy over
Indonesian Deforestation Funding, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/01/norway-accused-hypocrisy-
deforestation-funding, Dec. 1, 2011, (“Norway has been accused of climate hypocrisy in Indonesia, where it has won
plaudits for financing forest protection even as its state pension fund allegedly secures even greater revenues from
logging, plantations, mining and other environmentally destructive practices.”); see also BROKEN ETHICS, supra note 88
(alleging the Norwegian SWF is invested in companies that engage in ethical and international law violations); Sigrid
Folkestad, Economists call Norway’s climate policy hypocritical, SCIENCE NORDIC (May 4, 2013, 6:32 AM), http://
sciencenordic.com/economists-call-norways-climate-policy-hypocritical (“More and more economists are critical of
Norway’s prevailing climate policy and believe that the country should stop exploiting North Sea oil.”).
187See Investor Muscle, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug 8, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8eeb7524-002f-11e3-
9c40-00144feab7de.html#axzz2zs3qenxh.
188See Matthias Rieker, Norway Fund Takes On Some U.S. Firms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052970204083204577078651349087974.
189NBIM seeks proxy access at six US companies, NORGES BANK (Dec. 6, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.norges-bank.no/
en/about/published/press-releases/2011/nbim-seeks-proxy-access/.
190The Charles Schwab Corp., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Mar. 30, 2012); Wells Fargo & Co., Proxy Statement
(Form 14A) (Mar. 15, 2012); CME Group Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) (Apr. 25, 2012); Western Union, Proxy
Statement (Form 14A) (Apr. 10, 2012).
191Id.
192See Rieker, supra note 188.
193Norway Oil Fund Appoints Corporate Governance Advisory Board, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/08/norway-fund-idUSL4N0G95MS20130808.
194Ruth Sullivan, Norwegian Wealth Fund Set to Raise Bar on Governance, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013, 6:41 AM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ea0ede56-0fc9-11e3-99e0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zs3qenxh.
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It regularly votes for splitting the role of chair and chief executive at companies where
these are combined, notably at JPMorgan.195
Norway’s shift – as well as Qatar’s pioneering role in the Glencore deal – are indicative of this
emergent trend and will likely encourage other SWFs to become activist investors. With SWFs
taking a more aggressive role and with extensive collaboration anticipated, it is likely that some if
not many SWFs will contemplate joint strategy directives to advance specific goals. Doing so will
inevitably implicate US securities law. The next section will review some relevant securities laws
and proposes modifications in light of SWF activism.
III. UNITED STATES FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
United States federal securities laws obligate investors to publicly disclose certain market activities and
SWFs are required to adhere to these regulations.196 For example, once a SWF acquires 5 percent of a
company’s shares, the SWF is obligated to file a 13(d) disclosure.197 The rule was designed to provide
fairness and equal access to information and preclude investors from either taking certain actions
alone or in conjunction with other parties without public disclosure.198 These reporting requirements
are not designed or intended to review foreign investment, which, as outlined above, is primarily the
responsibility of CFIUS. However, the disclosure requirements can be an additional device useful in
alleviating concerns over improper SWF influence. This is particularly relevant to SWFs whose full power
has thus far not been exercised but can reasonably be anticipated to be utilized in the next few years.
Therefore, as they increase in size, SWFs may play an increasing role in financial markets
and this will lead to a new era in shareholder activism. This is not a short process, and
therefore, at least for several years, the SWF policy with regard to activism will not
reach the approach of the activist institutional investors. In the same time, we should
expect that, as SWFs continue to acquire equity interest in certain nations (e.g. US), the
issue of their engagement in corporate governance will continue to raise questions.199
The following sections discuss several rules and disclosure requirements which are applicable to
SWF investors in United States securities markets.
A. Rule 13(d) and Group Action
“[A]ny person” who is an investor in United States markets – including SWFs – must disclose
pursuant to section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)200 an acquisition
of a 5 percent or greater equity stake in a public company.”201 13(d) disclosures produce
transparency such as the existence of a conflict of interest as the rule compels the disclosure of
any arrangements in which investors maintain their financial interests.202 An illustration of the
disclosure of a potential conflict brought about by a 13(d) filing can be seen in the example of the
merger between King Pharmaceutical (King) and Mylan Laboratories (Mylan). The obligatory 13(d)
filing forced a hedge fund to reveal its hedging positions in the context of the merger battle
between Mylan and King.203 The hedge fund investment was structured to enable an investor to
195See Investor Muscle, supra note 187.
196Such regulations include the filing requirements of 13(d). See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(d) (2000) [hereinafter Exchange Act] (necessitating a public disclosure upon ownership of 5 percent of a public
company’s shares and the short-swing profit rules of 10 percent owners pursuant to 16(b)); see Exchange Act, 15 U.S.
C. § 16(a)(b) (2000). In addition, institutional money managers must comply with 13(f) which mandates disclosure on
a quarterly basis of registered securities totaling $100 million or more in the fund’s portfolio. To the extent SWFs
have this amount under management, SWFs are also obligated to file a 13(f).
197See Exchange Act, supra note 196, at § 78m(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2008).
198See Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir.1980) (“[T]he goal of s 13(d) is to alert the
marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities . . . which might represent a potential
shift in corporate control.”)
199See Nili, supra note 2.
200Exchange Act, supra note 196.
201Exchange Act, supra note 196, at § 78m(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2008).
202Exchange Act, supra note 196, at § 78m(d)(1)(E).
203See Robert Steyer, New Player Joins Mylan-King Fray, THESTREET (Nov. 29, 2004, 6:30 PM), http://www.thestreet.
com/stocks/robertsteyer/10196467.html (describing how Perry, a hedge fund holding a large number of shares in
King subsequently purchased shares in Mylan. Perry then entered into a derivate transaction hedging the fund’s
exposure to Mylan’s share price. Perry thus acquired shares in Mylan but since it had no financial interest in Mylan,
the fund had incentive to vote on the basis of its interest as a King shareholder.).
Page 22 of 33
Slawotsky. International Review of Law 2015:swf.8
profit from a conflict of interest and that conflict was revealed only through the 13(d) filing. With
regard to SWF investments, where such conflicts exist, they may contain elements of political or
strategic significance and thus disclosure of conflicts are even more vital.
The issue of group action is important. Under securities law, a group is formed when “two or
more persons act[ing] as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer.”204 This “prevent[s] a group
of persons who seek to pool their voting or other interests in the securities of an issuer from
evading the provision of the statute because no one individual owns more than [5%] of the
securities.”205 Thus, under SEC regulations, “beneficial ownership” of the securities held by any
group member will be attributed to all members of the group.206 Consequently, the securities law
“requires a group that has acquired, directly or indirectly, beneficial ownership of more than five
percent of a class of registered equity securities, to file a [Schedule] 13D . . . with the issuer, with
the exchanges on which the security is traded, and with the SEC, disclosing, among other things,
the identity of its members and the purpose of its acquisition.”207
The existence of personal or professional relationships between investors does not, by itself,
establish a “group” under 13(d). Rather, “the touchstone of a group within the meaning of Section
13(d) is that the members combined in furtherance of a common objective.”208 To constitute a
group, members of the alleged group must “agree[] to act together for the purpose of acquiring,
holding or disposing of [an issuer’s securities.]”209 Because the existence of a group requires an
agreement, “there must be evidence that indicate[s] an intention to act in concert over and above
the prior and continuing relationships between the various parties.”210 To allege the existence of
an agreement is not enough to show that the defendants are “related through blood, marriage,
business or social relationships.”211 There must be agreement to act in concert.212 The existence of
a group will not be inferred solely because multiple investors explored business dealings or
exchanged information related to the issuer.213
204Exchange Act, supra note 196, at § 78m(d)(3).
205H.R. 90-1711, 90th Cong. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2814.
20617 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (“When two or more persons agree to act together . . . the group formed thereby
shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership . . . as of the date of such agreement, of all equity securities
of that issuer beneficially owned by any such persons.”).
207Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 617 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(d)(3)). The question of whether whether a person can be a member of a “group” without being a beneficial owner,
has been addressed by only a few courts. These courts held that beneficial ownership of the equity securities is
necessary in order to be a member of a group as defined in section 13(d). See, e.g., Transcon Lines v. A.G. Becker
Inc., 470 F.Supp. 356, 373 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (“[I]n light of the purpose of Section 13(d) as evidenced by the legislative
history and as interpreted by other courts in analogous cases, the better rule is that one who is not the beneficial
owner of any shares of the subject company is not a member of a group within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3).”);
Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 145 (3d Cir.2001) (“[O]ne who does not have beneficial ownership of the
equity securities of an issuer cannot be a member of a group of individuals that do have beneficial ownership.”);
Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Inv., 553 F.3d 1351, 1366 (11th Cir.2008) (“[A] beneficial
ownership interest in securities is necessary to become a member of a group within the meaning of section 13(d)(3)
of the Exchange Act”). However, “beneficial ownership can arise out of “arrangements,’ ‘relationships,’ and ‘devices,’
as well as contracts’ and ‘understandings.’” See S.E.C. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 837 F.Supp. 587, 607
(S.D.N.Y.1993). “[T]he inquiry focuses on any relationship that, as a factual matter, confers on a person a significant
ability to affect how voting power or investment power will be exercised, because it is primarily designed to ensure
timely disclosure of market-sensitive data about changes in the identity of those who are able, as a practicable
matter, to influence the use of that power.” Id. (emphasis in original) quotation marks and citation omitted).
208Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 508 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 363
(2d Cir. 1982)).
209Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1)); see Corenco
Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 488 F.2d 207, 217 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[A]bsent an agreement between them a group would
not exist.”).
210Torchmark Corp. v. Bixby, 708 F.Supp. 1070, 1083 (W.D.Mo. 1988) (quoting K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co.,
607 F.Supp. 756, 765 (D.Colo. 1983)).
211708 F.Supp. at 1083.
212Id.
213See Vladimir v. Bioenvision, Inc., 606 F.Supp.2d 473, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he fact that [the CEO] may have
been in constant contact with Bioenvision board members is neither unusual nor inappropriate-board members of a
public company may speak with officers of the company about any number of topics pertaining to that company’s
business.’); K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F.Supp. at 767 (“finding that sharing of information regarding
issuer, among alleged members of group, “provides little support” for claim that alleged group members “agreed to
act in concert with others to acquire [issuer’s] stock””).
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Written evidence (such as emails) is not required to find a group.214 The existence of a group
may be shown by circumstantial evidence, including “prior relationships and trading patterns . . .
discussions between the defendants [and evidence of] . . . a particular modus operandi.”215
Moreover, courts have held that “[m]atters of group purpose are . . . difficult to discern, for intent
may not always be fully formed, but may mature and manifest at any point in a continuum.”216
The question of whether a group is formed is important yet not easily discernable. The subject of
group formation will likely arise as SWFs are working together and pooling resources in their
global investment forays. The next section discusses collaboration between SWFs and other
investors both SWF and non-SWF.
1. Increased collaboration: The prospect of SWF group
action/working together/acting in concert
In addition to becoming more activist, another aspect of recent SWF behavior is a surge in joint
activity and coordinated investment. Although SWF collaboration is not new, SWFs are increasing
collaboration among themselves as well as other large investors such as hedge funds and state-
owned public funds.217 In June 2010, the SWFs of Korea, China and Abu Dhabi jointly invested in
convertible preferred shares issued by Chesapeake in a $1.6 billion transaction led by Singapore’s
Temasek and Hopu Investments, a private equity fund. Several other large non-sovereign
institutional investors participated in the transaction including Blackrock Group and Franklin
Templeton.
If not a landmark deal, the Chesapeake Energy transaction was at least emblematic of a
new and growing trend: closer cooperation among SWF and between SWF and other like-
minded institutional investors. Let’s consider the facts: SWF from various countries, along
with other long-term oriented institutional investors, cooperated to invest in a large firm in
a third party country.218
The French state-owned investment fund Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (“CDC”) announced
a strategy of collaboration with SWFs:
As the first French investment corporation exclusively focusing on sovereign wealth funds,
CDC International’s first objective is to pursue the formation of bilateral investment vehicles
with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the Russian Federation. It will carry the Caisse
des Dépôts’ shares in these vehicles and will be responsible for the execution of their
investments. It will also be responsible for developing a multilateral investment platform
capable of attracting sovereign capital on a wider and more sustainable basis. CDC
International will thus become the Group’s instrument of long-term investment in
partnership with sovereign wealth funds.219
214Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d at 617.
215Id. at 617-18.
216Rosen v. Brookhaven Capital Mgmt. Co., Ltd., 113 F.Supp.2d 615, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
217See Jake Spring, Qatar’s wealth fund to launch $10 billion investment fund with China’s CITIC, REUTERS (Nov. 4,
2014, 5:10 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/11/04/qatar-china-sovereign-wealth-idINKBN0IO0QU20141104
(“QIA, which is estimated to have around $170 billion, and state-owned conglomerate CITIC Group signed a
memorandum of understanding to launch the 50-50 investment fund . . . QIA is looking for new partners as it plans
to invest between $15 billion and $20 billion in Asia in the next five years.”); Andrew Woodman, Apax Reaches $7.5b
Final Close on Latest Global Fund, ASIAN VENTURE CAPITAL JOURNAL (June 24, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://www.avcj.com/avcj/
news/2276793/apax-reaches-usd75b-final-close-on-latest-global-fund (noting that the SWFs of China, Singapore and
Australia jointly own 10 percent of APAX Partners a private equity fund); FACTBOX-Recent Investments by Qatar’s
Sovereign Wealth Fund, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2010, 8:40 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/06/qatar-investment-
idUSLDE6B516E20101206 (Qatar’s SWF partnered with China’s SWF to buy 40 percent of Songbird Estates, owner of
London’s Canary Wharf financial district.); Song Jung-a, S Korean Wealth Fund Joins Forces with Peers (June 19, 2009,
7:13 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3ccfa982-5cf9-11de-9d42-00144feabdc0.htmlaxzz2zs3qenxh (“Korea
Investment Corporation, South Korea’s sovereign wealth fund, has signed strategic joint investment deals with its
Malaysian counterpart and an Australian state-owned fund. The Korean fund said it had signed agreements with
Malaysia’s Khazanah Nasional Berhad and Australia’s QIC to ‘expand co-operation’ in searching for investment
opportunities and sharing information.”).
218See Scott E. Kalb, The Growing Trend of Cooperation among Sovereign Wealth Funds, in SOVEREIGN ASSET
MANAGEMENT FOR A POST CRISIS WORLD (Donghyun Park ed., 2011).
219See Caisse des Dépôts is to develop its subsidiary CDC International by dedicating it to investment partnerships
with sovereign wealth funds, CAISSE DES DÉPÔTS, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/fileadmin/Communiqu%
C3%A9s%20de%20presse/cp/cp_cdc_international_eng.pdf.
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Another example is the teaming up of Singaporean and Abu Dhabi SWFs to invest together in
Manhattan real estate.220 Sometimes, a SWF joins other pre-existing SWF investors in ownership of
a business.221
[T]he trend [of collaboration] was illustrated in an announcement by the Korea Investment
Corporation that it will build a new platform for cross-border private equity investment with
its counterpart in Russia, the Russian Direct Investment Fund. Each sovereign fund will put
in $250 million to start with, and the fund is envisaged to rise to $1 billion at some
unspecified stage.222
These recent examples of SWF cooperation illustrate an important phenomenon. While the
collaboration is grounded on commercial criteria, the significance lies in SWFs working together
which may result in efforts to achieve governance objectives without any single fund’s holdings
raising regulatory red flags. Collaboration among SWFs may also result in unified or joint lobbying
in governance matters. The role played by the Qatari SWF in the Glenstrata merger was a wake-up
call for boards all over the world which once used to rely upon the passive stance of SWFs.223
Joint ownership of publicly traded shares may, depending upon the totality of the circumstances,
constitute a group thereby raising the specter of aggregation of several holdings. The
collaboration/working together/acting in concert question was analyzed in a significant litigation
that dealt with group formation. The next section will discuss a major ruling from the Second
Circuit on the formation of groups which is particularly relevant as SWFs are similar to hedge
funds in terms of wielding vast capital.
2. The CSX litigation
In late 2007, hedge funds The Children’s Investment Fund Management and 3G Capital Partners
nominated five candidates to the board of a publicly traded company, CSX.224 The funds owned
9 percent of the stock directly and an additional 11 percent through long cash-settled
derivatives.225 CSX filed suit claiming the funds were derelict in their obligation to report their
cash-settled derivatives as beneficial ownership and moreover, their conduct constituted a “group”
pursuant to federal securities laws.
The district court held the funds violated Section 13(d) because they failed to timely disclose
that they had formed a group noting that whether entities can be deemed to act as a group is not
controlled by the existence of a formal agreement. According to the district court ruling, the
agreement “may be formal or informal, and need not be expressed in writing.”226 The court held
that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to find group formation227 and that the circumstantial
evidence – including an existing relationship, exchange of views, and meetings between the
parties – were indicative of a group.228
220Anjli Raval, Abu Dhabi and Singapore wealth funds invest in trophy Manhattan property, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 13,
2013, 10:31 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27550c5c-4c71-11e3-958f-00144feabdc0.html.
221See Santiago Perez, Qatar Holding Buys 20% Stake in BAA for $1.4 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2012, 1:06 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444375104577595242977156080 (Qatar joins Singaporean
SWF in ownership interest in BAA).
222See Chris Wright, Korea And Russia’s Sovereign Wealth Funds To Build Private Equity Together, FORBES (Nov. 14,
2013, 4:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2013/11/14/korea-and-russias-sovereign-wealth-funds-to-
build-private-equity-together/.
223See Nili, supra note 2.
224See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP, 562 F.Supp.2d 511, 518 (S.D.N.Y.2008).
225See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP, 562 F.Supp.2d 511, 516-527 (S.D.N.Y.2008).
This article does not discuss whether derivative based holdings should be counted. There has been some scholarship
on this topic. See, e.g., Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
127 (2009).
226Id. at 552.
227Id. (“The existence of a group turns on “whether there is sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to support
the inference of a formal or informal understanding between [members] for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
disposing of securities.”) quoting Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P. v. Gotham Partners, L.P., 286 F.3d 613, 617
(2d Cir.2002).
228Id. at 554 (“These circumstances—including the existing relationship, the admitted exchanges of views and
information regarding CSX, 3G’s striking patterns of share purchases immediately following meetings with Hohn and
Amin, and the parallel proxy fight preparations—all suggest that the parties’ activities from at least as early as
February 13, 2007, were products of concerted action notwithstanding the defendants’ denials.”).
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The Second Circuit disagreed holding that greater proof was required to establish that the two
funds were acting in concert.229 Mere evidence that the funds “met” and were acting together
“generally” was held insufficient. The Second Circuit held that plaintiff needed to demonstrate
proof the funds were acting to acquire CSX shares.
Although the District Court found the existence of a group “with respect to CSX securities,”
the Court did not explicitly find a group formed for the purpose of acquiring CSX securities.
Even if many of the parties’ “activities” were the result of group action, two or more
entities do not become a group within the meaning of section 13(d)(3) unless they
“act as a . . . group for the purpose of acquiring . . . securities of an issuer.”230
Thus, the mere meetings between the two hedge funds were held insufficient to demonstrate a
group had been formed. According to the Second Circuit, forming a group needs to be proven by
“a precise finding, adequately supported by specific evidence, of whether a group existed for
purposes of acquiring CSX shares outright during the relevant period needs to be made in order to
facilitate appellate review.”231 The Second Circuit thus held that the lynchpin of finding a “group”
depends upon the adequacy of evidence supporting the inference of either a formal or informal
understanding between members of the alleged group for the specific purpose of either acquiring,
holding, voting or disposing of securities. Without the specific goal of acquisition, holding, voting
or disposition of securities, it will be difficult to prove a group has been formed.232
As SWFs become more activist, the question that will arise is: When will multiple SWFs (or SWFs
and other funds) “working together” constitute a “group” within the meaning of the securities laws.
The affiliation may be with other SWFs or with a non-SWF investor. “Communication” or
“partnering” among SWFs (and between SWFs and other investors) may subject them to claims
that the SWFs formed an undisclosed 13(d) group. The CSX ruling did not give any bright-line test
nor any specific factors a court should examine. Moreover, to date there has not been any SEC
guidance with respect to defining what determines group action.
There is inherent ambiguity regarding which factors will militate towards the finding of a
group. Ostensibly SWFs are able to form groups to discuss various investment strategies yet at times
the rubicon of concerted action will be crossed. In the context of SWF relationships, a regional
alignment of SWFs may not create a group per se, but coordinated policy and activity may potentially
transform the individual members into a group. Concerted action must be distinguished from parallel
action although practically, it may be interchangeable. Take for example SWFs meeting at a working
group and exchanging views on the price of a commodity. It is conceivable that multiple SWFs will
leave the group intuitively knowing that it is in their financial interests to take parallel action on the
shares of a commodity producer and will in fact do so to their mutual beneficial interests. Yet no
agreement was made and officially no group has been formed.233 However, for all practical purposes,
the group has internalized that a concerted effort will occur. In this respect, SWFs are not different
than multiple hedge funds or any private investor. But as government controlled entities with
immense wealth, should SWFs be subject to enhanced scrutiny?
B. Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act - “Short-swing” profits
An important securities regulation is Section 16(b) which compels disgorgement of trading profits
earned within a six-month time fame when trades are engaged in by “insiders” such as directors,
officers, or holders of 10 percent of the shares.234 Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act provides, in
relevant part:
229654 F.3d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 2011).
230Id. at 284 (citation omitted).
231Id.
232At least in the Second Circuit which is a leading court for federal securities law.
233SWFs are generally counseled by large law firms who undoubtedly will advise their clients to avoid the formal
trappings of “group formation.”
234See Exchange Act, supra note 196, at § 16(b) which provides for the disgorgement of profits that corporate
insiders realize “from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security.” See Gibbons v.
Malone, 703 F.3d 595, 597 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The term ‘insider’ is frequently used in this context as a short-hand
way of referring to any person ‘who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of any class
of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 78l of this title, or
who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security.’ 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (“Section 16(a) of the 1934 Act”)).
Unanswered questions were raised in Gibbons, but not resolving, whether convertibility between financial instruments
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For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security
of such issuer . . . within any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction . . . . This subsection shall not be
construed to cover . . . any transaction or transactions which the [SEC] by rules and
regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.235
“[L]iability under Section 16(b) does not attach unless the plaintiff proves that there was (1) a
purchase and (2) a sale of securities (3) by an [insider] (4) within a six-month period.”).236
These investors must return back to the company any “profits” made from purchases and sales
made within a six-month period. Significantly, if two or more investors form a “group,” each group
member may be liable under Section 16(b) if, in the aggregate, the group’s holdings exceed ten
percent of the company’s nonexempt, registered equity securities. The regulation does not require
actual use or knowledge of insider information – the rule operates on a strict-liability basis.
In practical terms:
Notably, although § 16(b) is designed to curb the use of nonpublic knowledge by corporate
“insiders,” . . . the provision offers merely the “prophylactic” remedy of disgorgement, . . .
and “operates mechanically, with no required showing of intent” to profit from the use of
inside information, . . . The statute, in other words, “imposes a form of strict liability.”237
The current trigger for Section 16(b) applicability is a 10 percent ownership threshold. Under the
current regulatory structure, two or more SWFs (or an SWF and a non-SWF) could potentially own
less than 10% and engage in short-swing profit activity.238 Are SWF investors sufficiently different
as to justify heightened regulation?239
C. 13(f) Reporting
Large institutionally managed funds must disclose their equity holdings quarterly pursuant to
Section 13(f).240 While mutual and hedge funds are commonly known to qualify as funds which
encompass the 13(f) obligation, any institutionally managed fund totaling $100 million or more
must report.241 SWFs fall within the purview of 13(f)’s reporting requirements.242
SWFs are thus obligated to file quarterly reports - a “Form 13F Report” - with the SEC, disclosing,
among other things, the names, shares, and fair market value of the securities over which the
institutional manager exercise controls.243
Footnote continued
might be a sufficient condition to make those instruments matching securities under § 16(b). Gibbons, 703 F.3d at
603-04 (noting the court so held in Gund v. First Florida Banks, Inc., 726 F.2d 682 (11th Cir. 1984)). Various innovative
financial products raise creative questions with respect to 16(b) applicability. As one court noted, “the creativity of
Wall Street lawyers and bankers is boundless.” See Chechele v. Sperling, 758 F.3d 463, 467 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013)
(discussing whether a particular transaction constituted a 16b transaction.)
235See Exchange Act, supra note 196, at § 16(b).
236Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir.1998).
237Id.
238Groups can also be formed for 16(b) purposes. See Roth v. Perseus, 522 F.3d 242, 246 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing
Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 507 (2d Cir. 2007). Subsection 13(d)(3).
239Globalization and financial innovation demand that securities laws be examined with a view towards amending.
Even courts have remarked that the recent revolution in “securities” raise questions. See Roth v. Goldman Sachs
Group, Inc., 740 F.3d 865, 867 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Although Section 16(b) is long in the tooth-older even than the author
of this opinion-and the subject of countless judicial interpretations, it seems to be an ever-growing fount of close
questions as to its meaning.”).
240Exchange Act, supra note 196, at § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2000). While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act renumbered paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5) of Section 13(f) as paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6).
Pub.L. No. 111-203, s 929X, 124 Stat. 1376, 1870 (2010) this article employs the pre-Dodd-Frank numbering system.
241Section 13(f)(5)(A) defines “institutional investment manager” as “any person, other than a natural person,
investing in or buying and selling securities for its own account, and any person exercising investment discretion with
respect to the account of any other person.” 15 U.S.C. s 78m(f)(5)(A).
242According to the SEC, SWFs do have 13(f) reporting requirements. Ethiopis Tafara, Testimony Concerning The
Regulatory Framework for Sovereign Investments, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.sec.
gov/news/testimony/2008/ts0342408et.htm. Thus, to the extent SWFs do not file a 13(f) they are violating this
obligation.
243See 17 C.F.R. s 240.13f-1(a)(1) (requiring quarterly disclosure on Form 13F); 15 U.S.C. s 78m(f)(1) (2010)
(delineating disclosure requirements).
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Interestingly, the SEC has granted exemptions to the disclosure requirements.
The Commission must make 13F information publicly available unless either of two
exemptions applies. First, under paragraph 13(f)(2), “[t]he Commission, by rule, or order,
may exempt, conditionally or unconditionally, any institutional investment manager . . . .”
Second, under paragraph 13(f)(3), the Commission “may delay or prevent public disclosure”
“as it determines it to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.” Managers seeking a permanent exemption under paragraph 13(f)
(2) or temporary confidential treatment under paragraph 13(f)(3) must submit enough
information on Form 13F for the Commission to make an informed judgment as to the
merits of the request.244
There are two concerns which need to be addressed. One, are all SWFs currently filing 13(f)s? To the
extent SWFs do not file a 13(f) they are violating this obligation. Does the SEC ensure that all SWFs
file? Two, has the SEC granted either filing or confidentiality exemptions to SWFs or should it do so if
requested? Do SWFs present circumstances that obviate the interests in granting an exemption?
IV. PROPOSALS FOR A REGULATORY UPDATE
For the immense financial power of SWFs and their potential political motivations, there is no
practical difference justifying any regulatory update; SWFs, however, are different. Does the current
regulatory structure adequately address the uniqueness of SWFs? Inasmuch as SWFs are truly a
hallmark of a new global financial order, the existing rules – while providing an excellent
framework – should be modified. While any proposals cannot completely prevent abusive conduct
(any more or any less than the current regulations) the suggested proposals comprise a
reasonable attempt to balance the competing interests of encouraging investment while mindful of
the extraordinary characteristics of SWFs.
Anxieties regarding SWFs are heightened given that multiple SWFs may act together as a
group. An alliance of interests by several nations acting in concert to advance a financial goal
should be cause for concern to US regulators. Multiple nations may seek to control a company or
a specific strategic economic sector by purchasing individual stakes small enough to avoid
reporting requirements, while jointly owning at least a 5 percent holding or a controlling
percentage of a company. Such a position would allow them to pressure management, or engage
in other activist (or illegal behavior) without filing the required disclosure statements. Multiple
SWFs can easily engage in sweeping corporate influence with barely a dent in their portfolios and
without attractive regulatory or investor attention.245
What if an SWF has a relationship with a hedge fund or with a venture capital firm (or owns a part
of such fund) and both parties enter into an understanding that the SWF will use its considerable
influence to persuade a SWF held portfolio company to allocate a special class of newly issued
shares to the hedge fund or venture capital firm? Such an agreement might implicate the question of
whether, under Rule 13(d), the SWF and the other fund acted as a “group” for the purposes of the
newly issued shares. There are numerous permutations of this potential. The point is that SWFs can
be expected to utilize their status as financial superstars to influence companies to allocate benefits
with respect to “acquiring or disposing” of shares and by doing so, 13(d) concerns are raised.
13(d) disclosures also produce transparency such as the existence and extent of a conflict of
interest. Section 13(d) compels the disclosure of any arrangements in which investors maintain their
financial interests.246 Sometimes it is this 13(d) requirement that forces investors to reveal conflicts.
For example, hedge fund Perry divulged its hedging positions in the Mylan-King take-over battle.247
Where such conflicts exist, they would have to be disclosed in a 13(d) filing. Hedge fund Third Point’s
13(d) filing on Sotheby’s shares corroborates 13(d)’s benefits of conflicts disclosure.248
244See Full Value Advisors LLC, v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1101, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
245SWFs interests may conflict with the interests of other shareholders but that is similar to other large investors.
For example, SWFs can buy shares in ExxonMobil and attempt to use that position to increase the value of a stake in
another company rather than to maximize the share price of ExxonMobil. However, this phenomenon is not unique to
SWFs but is applicable to other large investors as well.
246Exchange Act, supra note 196, at § 13(d)(1)(E).
247See Steyer, supra note 203.
248See Sotheby’s, Schedule 13D (Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/823094/
000119312513346480/d588939dsc13d.htm (“Certain of the Funds have entered into swaps with respect to the Shares.
Under the terms of the swaps, (i) the relevant Fund will be obligated to pay to the counterparty any negative price
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Activist investors are known to inform other investors of their trades – particularly since 13(d)
provides a 10 day window before filing is required.249 Hedge fund corporate activism is generally
waged as a quasi-political campaign – with a media blitz, publicly disclosed letters to
management, and press releases even prior to reaching the 5 percent trigger.250
The way US securities law works, if you buy more than 5 percent of a public company’s
stock, you have to disclose what you’re up to. But you get 10 days from the time you cross
over 5 percent until you have to make the disclosure on Schedule 13D. That gives you
10 days to keep buying in secret, so that when you actually disclose you might have
6 or 7 or 10 or 30 percent of the stock instead of just the 5 percent.
The Wall Street Journal has a pretty good story about what you might be doing during that
time, at least if you’re an activist investor or noisy short seller. You’re telling all your little
hedge-fund buddies about the stake you’ve built, so they can buy in too.251
However, SWFs from nations with less accountable regimes may act opaquely to acquire a
position. Hedge fund activism engenders a substantially less urgent market hazard. Moreover,
what if multiple SWFs amass shares of a company – with or without tipping – similar to how
other activist investors buy into the same company? Given the strategic depth of financial
resources available to SWFs, it is not beyond the realm of the remote that multiple SWFs will act
in concert, both in the acquisition of shares and in activist activities such as the pressuring of
management. Thus, SWF compliance with the required disclosure obligations under section 13(d) is
vital and underscores the necessity of updating the reporting requirements.
A. A lower threshold for 13(d) disclosure
As outlined above, US securities laws are meant to prevent improper acquisitions of shares
without proper public disclosure. The problem with the current regulatory structure is that it was
developed as a way to regulate private actors. SWFs, however, raise serious concerns due to their
dual public and private characteristics. The 5 percent disclosure trigger needs to be updated.
As government-owned entities with concomitant latent political risks, SWFs require a modified
rule. However, the free movement of investment capital across borders must be encouraged.
Therefore, the obligations must balance both interests. Under the current requirements, two or
more SWFs from different nations could potentially own less than 5 percent and not file.
Therefore, a disclosure filing should be required whenever a SWF holds 2.5 percent or more of a
company’s shares as opposed to 5 percent. This will eliminate the filing requirement when a SWF
holds an inconsequential amount of shares. For example, if a SWF simply wants to diversify its
holdings across a broad array of companies investing up to 2.5 percent in each company will not
trigger any obligation. SWFs will not feel heightened scrutiny for mere diversification. Yet,
providing a lower trigger percentage for such funds will allow government regulators and other
interested parties to become aware of the SWF share acquisition and significantly will provide a
more extensive ability to observe potential group activity. Lowering the trigger percentage will
substantially increase transparency without unduly burdening or discouraging SWF investment.
This proposal would require SWFs to file more frequently as the threshold is lower. Several
drawbacks exist to this proposal. For SWFs, this would mean a lower amount of shares that can
be acquired without calling attention to the investment. The proposal would also require SWFs to
adjust internal record keeping to ensure the 2.5 percent limit is not breached without filing. SWFs
Footnote continued
performance of the specified notional number of Shares subject to the swaps as of the expiration date of such
swaps, plus interest rates set forth in the applicable contracts, and (ii) the counterparty will be obligated to pay the
relevant Fund any positive price performance of the specified notional number of Shares subject to the swaps as of
the expiration date of the swaps.”).
249Concerns have been raised regarding activist funds “tipping” other funds about acquisitions. See Theodore Mirvis,
Activist Abuses Require SEC Action on Section 13(d) Reporting, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Mar. 31, 2014, 9:09 AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/03/31/activist-abuses-require-
sec-action-on-section-13d-reporting/ (arguing for a shortened time frame for reporting from ten days to one day).
250See, e.g., Li Yuan & Christopher Rhoads, Icahn Bid Adds to Woes Dogging Motorola’s CEO, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31,
2007, at A1 (article on Carl Icahn’s purchase of a 1.39 percent stake in Motorola).
251See Matt Levine, Should Activist Shareholders Be Allowed to Talk to Their Buddies?, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 28, 2014,
11:53 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-03-28/should-activist-shareholders-be-allowed-to-talk-to-their-
buddies.
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may also incur slightly increased administrative responsibilities and legal fees. Moreover,
compliance with an update regulatory requirement may potentially discourage SWFs from investing
in United States equity markets. However, these costs and risks are worthwhile. Global regulatory
authorities, including the SEC, are requiring greater transparency from public companies and their
executives, the same policy concerns demand greater transparency with respect to investors
particularly given the quasi-governmental nature of SWFs.
The most widespread fear is that SWFs may act under the pressure of the home State with
the aim of advancing and achieving political and geo-political goals, rather than acting as
purely market investors that intend to pursue economic objectives. Therefore, SWFs
investment decisions – especially when they take the form of mergers and acquisitions –
may harm the socio-political-economic stability of the host State.252
The acquisition of shares by SWFs deserves superior transparency. Therefore, a lower threshold is
an appropriate response and will not prevent or discourage legitimate SWF investment.
B. Multiple SWFs from the same nation
Multiple SWFs from the same nation should be treated as members of a group and their several
holdings of any qualifying security should be aggregated. Rule 13(d) mandates aggregation of all
holdings in which the owner has a direct or beneficial interest in. Pursuant to current regulation,
multiple SWFs from the same nation could potentially be considered as separate investors. After
all, these funds may have separate management teams, separate directors, separate investment
managers and varying goals and purposes. Yet, despite the differences, the SWFs have a common
controlling parent – the specific state. The key is whether the different investors are under the
“control” of a specific party. Similar to traditional domestic investment funds created as part of a
family of funds, SWFs from the same nation are inextricably linked by a common sponsor or
ultimate owner– in this case the sovereign.
Regulators must assume that the parent sovereign is a controlling participant in the
management and policy of such SWFs. Therefore, a rebuttable presumption should exist that
SWFs created by the same sovereign share the same owner, and therefore are under the control
of a single entity. The Investment Company Act (ICA)253 provides a relevant example from
securities law of such a presumption. Under the ICA, an “interested person” is “any affiliated
person” of an investment adviser or principal underwriter.254 An “affiliated person” is defined as
“directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such other
person.”255 “Control,” in turn, is defined as “the power to exercise a controlling influence over the
management or policies of a company.”256 Accordingly, utilizing the ICA definition, control is the
power to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of a company, a link
connecting not only affiliates of both the controlling and controlled parties, but also parties under
mutual control. Applying this model to the regulation of SWF investment, the sovereign would be
presumed to exercise a controlling influence on the management and policy of the SWF.257
As owners, the power to elect directors, make business decisions and guide the overall
functioning of the SWF, the state parent would be in overwhelming overall control of all of
the “family of SWFs.”
To be sure, there might arise unusual circumstances whereby a SWF can demonstrate true
independence from other SWFs from the same nation. This would seem dependent upon
demonstrating true and meaningful lack of state control over the particular SWF. Perhaps the SWFs
have different lawyers and accountants. Perhaps the SWFs do not share directors. Maybe the SWFs
have different investment managers. These factors would cut against finding the SWFs under the
control of the parent. Yet, the fact that the state is the ultimate owner of the SWFs should weigh
significantly in finding state control despite the distinctions. Accordingly, all share holdings from
multiple SWFs from the same nation should be aggregated for 13(d) disclosure purposes.
252See Gallo, supra note 49, at page 5 (emphasis added).
25315 U.S.C. § 80a-2 [hereinafter ICA].
254Id. at § 80a-2(a)(19)(B).
255Id. at § 80a-2(a)(3)(C).
256Id. at § 80a-2(a)(9).
257See Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Citisource, Inc. Securities
Litigation, 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2009).
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In sum, the state, as owner or controlling party of the SWFs, should be deemed to be the
beneficial owner of securities in all their SWF “same family” accounts over which it exercises
control.
C. Multiple SWFs from different nations
Another area for potential updating is when multiple SWFs from different nations acquire shares in
the same company. SWFs that are owned by separate states present a more difficult issue.
Generally, investments by SWFs from different nations would be considered separate. However, if
different SWFs were part of a group then each member’s holdings would be aggregated. In light of
CSX, finding group formation is not easy. Consider the possibility that when SWFs from different
nations obtain stakes in the same entity they may be doing so for a shared financial motive.
Such motive may be also be trumped by a shared ideological agenda. States have in the past
acted for ideological reasons and willingly lost money as long as they advanced a political goal.
For example, the former Soviet Union lost considerable sums of money for many years by buying
sugar from Cuba at above-market prices in exchange for oil sold at below-market prices.258
Guarding against such activity wherein multiple SWFs from different nations constitute a group is
difficult. It is expected that pure financial motivations as opposed to political interests may
constitute a primary driving force of investment decisions. Oil and natural gas exporters may wish
to drive up or cause a temporary decline in the price of energy commodities or capture particularly
lucrative export markets. As a result, the respective governments may influence their SWFs to
exercise influence to induce portfolio companies to make decisions in the interest of the
sovereigns. Under CSX, tacit alignments may be insufficient to establish concerted action. Even
without direct evidence of group activity, membership in an organization dedicated to the upward
movement of commodity prices should at least cause regulators to look more closely at the
investments made by SWFs from member states. Examples of suspicious activity could include the
elimination of plans to open new sources of production or the decision to scrap exploration plans.
To tackle this problem, the SEC should employ an aggressive approach, perhaps establishing a
department to monitor SWF 13(d) and 13(f) filings. There are circumstantial markers of group
activity that, together with a reduced trigger for filings, may allow open and active investment
capital while simultaneously thwarting abusive conduct.
Another example is investments from SWFs controlled by that particular nation’s elites. Governing
without accountability, such nations may easily forge an alliance of interests with other similarly
governed sovereigns to benefit the ruling elites, forming a sort of “investment club” for their mutual
benefit. “[I]n certain . . . countries, all or most of the country’s economic endeavors emanate from
the government . . . . This troublesome situation is further complicated by the fact that in many
countries it is difficult to separate investment by the ruling class, as individuals, from investment by a
foreign government.”259 Therefore, a group of nations with like-minded rulers may be motivated to
utilize their SWFs in a coordinated fashion. These markers for heightened government scrutiny
explored above are only examples of a variety of factors that regulators may wish to consider.
As described above, an alignment of interests is an indication of whether the SWFs share a
common purpose, which is a potential marker of whether a group exists. Nations in such a bloc
may seek to exercise influence in the boardroom for the benefit of the collective community.
Therefore, absent a showing of independence, the several interests of SWFs belonging to a bloc of
nations that share the same community aspirations should lead to heightened scrutiny. The SEC
should establish a dedicated department to monitor filings of SWFs with a view towards ensuring
multiple allied or bloc member SWFs have not formed a group.
D. A lower threshold for 16(b)
The 10 percent short-swing bright line trigger needs to be updated. As government-owned entities
with concomitant latent political risks, a different rule is needed. However, the free movement of
investment capital across borders must be encouraged. Therefore, the suggested rule must
balance both interests. 16(b) should be amended to requiring disgorgement whenever a SWF
258See Timeline: Post-Revolution Cuba, supra note 90.
259See Brett R. Dick, U.S. Income Taxation of Foreign Governments, International Organizations and Their
Employees, 913-3RD TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO, 2005, at A4.
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holds 5.0 percent or more of a company’s shares as opposed to 10 percent. This will encourage
SWFs to invest for financial returns on a long-term basis which is their often stated goal.
The 5 percent rule will not burden SWFs and after the six months they are free to make a trade
and keep their profits. However, it should discourage SWFs from making trades based upon any
information it garners outside public channels. Moreover, SWFs who merely want diversification
over a large base of companies should not be affected whatsoever. Yet it will simultaneously
caution SWFs who may want to coordinate with other investors and form a group from engaging
in trading on inside information.
E. 13(f) monitoring
Regarding 13(f), it is unclear whether all SWFs are in compliance with this obligation.260
For example, China’s CIC did not file a 13F until 2010 despite having a huge portfolio of shares
prior to that date.261 “China Investment Corp (CIC), a $300 billion sovereign wealth fund based in
Beijing, filed its first quarterly disclosure on US equity holdings, reporting that it owned stocks
valued at $9.63 billion as of December 31.”262 To tackle the problem of non-reporting, the SEC
should employ an aggressive approach and the SEC should establish a special department
dedicated to monitoring 13(f) filings to ensure all SWFs are in compliance. In addition, given the
foreign government – private actor dualism intrinsic to SWFs, the SEC should not grant
exemptions to the 13(f) filing or public disclosure requirements.
CONCLUSION
Activist investing, once the domain of financial entrepreneurs, has become a normal activity of
large institutional funds. Iconic government pension funds such as CalPERS have joined hedge
funds in engaging in profits-centric shareholder activism. SWFs, as a category of large investment
funds, can be anticipated to implement a more activist investing style. While SWFs share many of
the same attributes as any other large investor, they are inherently different. As state-owned or
controlled, and guardians of public assets, SWFs are not pure private market actors. United States
Government regulations cannot simply overlook the fact that SWFs are intrinsically different since
SWFs are foreign government owned as opposed to being under the control of a purely private
actor. Although CFIUS is the principal mechanism to block foreign control or influence over key
United States industries, the securities laws can serve as an important secondary device to thwart
such conduct. Moreover, in light of the Ralls v. Obama appeals court ruling, and the potential of
changes to CFIUS, securities laws are even more vital. While the disclosure laws were intended to
prevent inequitable or prejudicial takeovers and not designed to screen foreign ownership, the
disclosure rules can serve as an important complement.
This article proposes that due to the extraordinary nature of SWFs, the trigger percentage for
13(d) filings be reduced from 5 percent to 2.5 percent. In addition, several holdings of a company’s
shares owned by multiple SWFs from the same nation ought to be treated in the aggregate.
Regulators should be on the alert for potential group action by SWFs from different nations and
between SWFs and other large investors. The trigger percentage for 16(b) disgorgement should be
lowered to 5 percent. In addition, regulators should strive to ensure SWFs comply with their 13(f)
reporting obligations and ensure no exemptions are granted to SWFs. The proposals seek to strike
a reasonable balance between concerns over SWFs and unfairness to SWFs. The suggested
modifications will allow legitimate SWF investment to proceed without unduly harming or
discouraging such investment. Simultaneously, stronger regulatory oversight and enhanced
disclosure will serve as another mechanism in detecting improper SWF conduct. Doing so is
particularly important in the context of increasing activism on the part of large funds. Activism has
260See, e.g., Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the U.S. Regulatory Framework for Assessing Sovereign
Investments, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg50400/html/CHRG-110s
hrg50400.htm (“There are a large number of entities that have filed Forms 13F, most of which are not sovereign
wealth funds or state-owned enterprises.”).
261See Guo Li, Demystifying the Chinese Sovereign Wealth Fund Amidst U.S. Financial Regulation, 2 TSINGHUA CHINA
L. REV. 353, 368 (2012). The 13(f) revealed extensive US holdings. China Investment Co., Holdings Report 13F (Feb. 5,
2010), available at China Investment Co., Holdings Report (Form 13F) (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1468702/000095012310009135/c95690e13fvhr.txt.
262Id.
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not merely been growing but the desire and ability to exploit the existing rules have also
increased. “[A]ctivist hedge funds have grown more brazen in exploiting the existing reporting
rules to the disadvantage of ordinary investors.”263 SWFs and large pension and hedge funds
present a powerful combination of potential influence in corporate America. Modifying the rules
as to SWFs will serve to lessen anxiety over foreign governmental intervention thus preventing
measures which may harm FDI.264
263See Mirvis, supra note 249 (arguing that the current ten day reporting window for 13(d) is outmoded given the
immense changes in technology since 1968).
264A balanced approach reflecting the competing goals of enhanced scrutiny and encouraging capital investment.
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